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ABSTRACT
Distributed systems ranging from small local area networks to large wide area networks
like the Internet composed of static and/or mobile users have become increasingly popular.
A desirable property for any distributed service is fault-tolerance, which means the service re-
mains uninterrupted even if some components in the network fail. This dissertation considers
weak distributed models to find either algorithms to solve certain problems or impossibility
proofs to show that a problem is unsolvable.
These are the main contributions of this dissertation.
 Failure detectors are used as a service to solve consensus (agreement among nodes)
which is otherwise impossible in failure-prone asynchronous systems. We find an al-
gorithm for crash-failure detection that uses bounded size messages in an arbitrary,
partitionable network composed of badly behaved channels that can lose and reorder
messages.
 Registers are a fundamental building block for shared memory emulations on top of
message passing systems. The problem has been extensively studied in static systems.
However, register emulation in dynamic systems with faulty nodes is still quite hard
and there are impossibility proofs that point out scenarios where change in the system
composition due to nodes entering and leaving (also called churn) makes the problem
unsolvable.
We propose the first emulation of a crash-fault tolerant register in a system with
continuous churn where consensus is unsolvable, the size of the system can grow without
bound and at most a constant fraction of the number of nodes in the system can fail by
crashing. We prove a lower bound that states that fault-tolerance for dynamic systems
with churn is inherently lower than in static systems.
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 We then extend the results in the crash-fault tolerant case to a dynamic system with
continuous churn and nodes that can be Byzantine faulty. It is the first emulation
of an atomic register in a system that can withstand nodes continually entering and
leaving, imposes no upper bound on the system size and can tolerate Byzantine nodes.
However, the number of Byzantine faulty nodes that can be tolerated is upper bounded
by a constant number. Although the algorithm requires that there be a constant known
upper bound on the number of Byzantine nodes, this restriction is unavoidable, as we
show that it is impossible to emulate an atomic register if the system size and maximum
number of servers that can be Byzantine in the system is unknown.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction and Related Work
A distributed system is a collection of computers (or nodes) that communicate amongst
themselves via wired or wireless communication channels, to perform a given task. Dis-
tributed computing refers to the use of distributed systems to solve computational problems.
There are several reasons for using distributed systems and distributed computing: (1) there
might be a need for communication network in an application (for example, if data produced
at one geographical location is required as an input at a diﬀerent geographical location), (2)
it is more cost eﬃcient to build several low-end computers than a single high-end one, (3)
distributed systems are more reliable than sequential systems as there isn’t just one point of
failure, and (4) it is easier to expand a distributed system than a single node.
There are two main models of computation considered in distributed systems: shared-
memory model and message-passing model. In the shared memory model, memory is shared
by the nodes in the system, which can exchange information by reading and writing data.
In the message-passing model, communication takes place by means of messages exchanged
between the nodes.
Distributed systems can be broadly categorized as synchronous or asynchronous based on
the timing guarantees the system provides. More specifically, a synchronous message-passing
system comes with strong guarantees: nodes have globally synchronized clocks and the upper
Parts of the material in this chapter are reprinted with permission from the following papers:
“Emulating a shared register in a system that never stops changing" by Hagit Attiya, Hyun Chul Chung,
Faith Ellen, Saptaparni Kumar and Jennifer L. Welch, 2019. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 30, pp. 544-559, copyright [2019] by IEEE
“Simulating a shared register in an asynchronous system that never stops changing" by Hagit Attiya,
Hyun Chul Chung, Faith Ellen, Saptaparni Kumar and Jennifer L. Welch, 2015. in Proceedings of 29th
International Symposium on Distributed Computing, pp. 75-91, copyright [2015] by Springer
“Implementing P with Bounded Messages on a Network of ADD Channels" by Saptaparni Kumar and
Jennifer L. Welch, 2019. Parallel Processing Letters, Volume 29, No 1, 1950002, copyright [2019] by World
Scientific Publishing Company
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bound on the message delivery time is a known value D. Examples of synchronous systems
are certain large centralized multiprocessing computers and VLSI chips containing many
separate parallel processing elements. An asynchronous message-passing system comes with
the weakest guarantees: nodes have no notion of real time as they do not possess synchronized
clocks and there is no upper bound on the message delivery time.
Distributed message-passing systems can be either static or dynamic depending on the
topology of the system. In static systems the system composition is fixed, i.e., the nodes in
the system do not change over time. There has been a lot of research on static systems and
most problems in distributed computing like leader election [1], mutual exclusion [2], etc.
have been formulated with static systems in mind. In dynamic systems, nodes may enter,
leave or move in the system with time, resulting in changes in the system composition. With
the advent of smartphones, intelligent cars, unmanned aerial vehicles, weather bots, etc.,
dynamic systems have become very realistic models of computation.
In distributed message-passing systems, the possibility of channel and node failures makes
problem solving challenging. A fault-tolerant algorithm is one that solves the problem cor-
rectly even in the presence of failure of some of its components (nodes or channels). It is
important to tolerate faults as it provides robust systems that have high availability. There
are several types of faults that need to be tolerated. A crash failure occurs when a node
halts, but was working correctly until it halts. An omission failure occurs when a node fails
to receive incoming messages or send outgoing messages. A timing failure occurs when a
node’s message delivery lies outside the specified delivery time interval (if any). A Byzantine
failure [3] is considered to be the worst kind of failure that can happen in any distributed
system. Malicious attacks, operator mistakes, software errors and conventional crash faults
are all encompassed by the term Byzantine failures.
In this dissertation, we describe our work to provide fault-tolerant distributed services in
distributed systems. A service can be thought of as a building block, used to solve important
and interesting problems for other applications. The services we provide are introduced next.
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1.1.1 Failure Detection in Partitionable Networks Composed of Ill-Behaved
Channels
Failure detectors were proposed by Chandra and Toueg [4] as oracles to be used to
identify failed nodes in an asynchronous message-passing system with crash failures. They
are an important distributed service in the network topology layer of a distributed system,
as they help circumvent the FLP [5] impossibility result which states that it is impossible to
solve the agreement problem (also known as consensus [6, 7]) in a crash-prone asynchronous
message-passing system.
Consensus is a very fundamental yet universal problem. In distributed computing and
multi-agent systems, it is often necessary to achieve overall system reliability in the presence
of a number of crash-faulty processes. This often requires processes to agree on some data
value that is needed during computation. Examples of applications of consensus include
whether to commit a transaction to a database, agreeing on the identity of a leader, state
machine replication, and atomic broadcasts. Real world applications include clock synchro-
nization, PageRank, opinion formation, smart power grids, state estimation, control of UAVs,
load balancing and others.
Failure detector implementation in practice requires some degree of partial or even full
synchrony. There are two main lines of research in the area of failure detectors. The first one
involves implementing failure detectors on increasingly weaker system models that represent
practical applications and the second one involves finding the weakest failure detector for
solving a given problem. We contribute to the first line of research and implement a failure
detector as a service to solve other important problems like consensus, leader election and
clock synchronization (in the middleware layer of a distributed system), on a failure-prone,
distributed message-passing system composed of channels that are ill-behaved (they may
lose and reorder messages). Our failure detection algorithm uses bounded sized heartbeat
messages, timeouts and path information to determine if there is a reliable path between
two nodes.
3
1.1.2 Fault-Tolerant Register Implementation in Systems with Churn
A distributed data structure is an important service in the middleware layer of a dis-
tributed system that provides data storage and organization for access by multiple nodes
in the system. The shared-memory model is considered to be a more convenient program-
ming model than message-passing and distributed data structures provide the illusion of
shared-memory on top of message-passing models.
However, implementing a data structure in a message-passing system is not a trivial
task to accomplish mainly due to the presence of concurrency. Take a distributed register
data structure for example. If two nodes invoke a write operation on a distributed register
concurrently, the question remains, in which order should the write operations be executed?
To tackle this issue, correctness for a distributed data structure is defined by the sequential
specification of the data structure and a consistency condition. Each data structure has
a sequential specification which specifies its behavior in the absence of concurrency. A
consistency condition is a set of rules that tie together the sequential specification with what
happens in the presence of concurrency. One of the most widely used consistency conditions
is linearizability, introduced by Herlihy and Wing [8] in 1990. A data structure is said to be
linearizable if it guarantees that every operation appears to happen at a single point in time
between the invocation and response of the operation.
Now we move our attention to the implementation of registers. A shared register is a
fundamental service used by middleware in a distributed system, that stores a value and has
two operations: read, which returns the value stored in the register, and write, which updates
the value stored. Implementing a shared register on top of an asynchronous message-passing
system is an important task in distributed systems as registers serve as building blocks for
more powerful data structures like queues, stack, etc.
Shared register implementations can be complicated by the possibility of faulty nodes
in the system. A fault can range from being benign (crash faults) to extremely adversarial
(Byzantine faults). To tackle the possibility of faults and for load balancing, many shared
4
register implementations replicate the value of the register in multiple servers and require
readers and writers to communicate with a certain fraction of servers. A lot of research in
this area has focused on implementing linearizable (also called atomic) shared registers. In
this dissertation, we deal with register implementation that tolerates two types of faults:
crash faults and Byzantine faults. We weaken the system model by making it dynamic.
Along with fault tolerance, we tolerate churn: change in system composition due to nodes
entering and leaving, thus making the system guarantees extremely weak.
We now briefly describe the main results we have for fault-tolerant atomic register emu-
lations.
1.1.2.1 Crash-Tolerant Registers
Most of the work in the area of crash fault tolerant registers has focused on emulating
atomic shared registers. For example, the ABD emulation [9] replicates the value of the
register in server nodes. It assumes that a majority of the server nodes do not fail. Consider
the simplified case of a single writer and a single reader. To write the value v, the writer
sends v, tagged with a sequence number, to all servers and waits for acknowledgments from
a majority of them. Similarly, to read, the reader contacts all servers, waits to receive values
from a majority of them, and then returns the value with the highest sequence number. This
approach can be extended to the case of multiple writers and multiple readers by having each
operation consist of a read phase, used by a writer to determine its sequence number and
used by a reader to obtain the return value, followed by a write phase, used by a writer to
disseminate the value (and sequence number) and used by a reader to announce the sequence
number of the value it is about to return [10]. We know from the ABD emulation [9] and
Attiya and Welch [6] that a crash-fault-tolerant atomic register in the static setting can be
implemented if and only if a majority of the nodes are non-faulty.
The success of this approach for static systems, where the set of nodes (readers, writers,
and servers) is fixed, has motivated several similar emulations for dynamic systems, where
nodes may enter and leave. Existing simulations of atomic registers rely either on the as-
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sumption that churn eventually stops for a long enough period (e.g., DynaStore [11] and
RAMBO [12]) or on the assumption that the system size is bounded (e.g., [13]). In our
atomic register implementation, we want to take a diﬀerent approach: We want to allow
churn to continue forever, while still ensuring that read and write operations complete and
nodes can enter and leave the system thus allowing changes in the system size.
Our work in Section 3.1 presents the first emulation of a register supporting any number
of readers and writers in a crash-prone system that can withstand nodes continually entering
and leaving and imposes no upper bound on the system size. The algorithm works as long as
the number of nodes entering and leaving during a fixed time interval is at most a constant
fraction of the system size at the beginning of the interval, and as long as the number of
crashed nodes in the system is at most a constant fraction of the current system size.
In addition to that, we prove a lower bound on the fraction of correct nodes that is
strictly larger than the fraction suﬃcient to solve the problem in the static case.
1.1.2.2 Byzantine-Tolerant Registers
Byzantine faults are considered to be the worst kind of faults that can happen in any
distributed system. Emulating a Byzantine-tolerant register requires replicating the register
value on to more than two-thirds of the servers. Emulating a register in a dynamic system
where servers and clients can enter and leave the system and be faulty is harder than in
static systems.
Our work in Section 3.2 presents the first emulation of a multi-reader multi-writer atomic
register in a system that can withstand nodes continually entering and leaving, imposes no
upper bound on the system size and can tolerate Byzantine servers. The algorithm works
as long as the number of servers entering and leaving during a fixed time interval is at most
a constant fraction of the system size at the beginning of the interval, and as long as the
number of Byzantine servers in the system is at most f . Although the algorithm requires that
there be a constant known upper bound on the number of Byzantine servers, this restriction
is unavoidable, as we show that it is impossible to emulate an atomic register if the system
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size and maximum number of servers that can be Byzantine in the system is unknown to
the nodes.
1.1.3 Roadmap
Section 2.1 describes our work [14, 15] in implementing a failure detector in an arbitrary
partitionable network composed of ill-behaved channels. Paper [15] has been accepted to
Parallel Processing Letters, 2019. Our work on crash-tolerant atomic register implementation
in systems with continuous churn is described in Section 3.1. The preliminary version of
this work [16] appeared in International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC),
2015. The extended version of this work [17] appears on IEEE Transactions on Parallel
and Distributed Systems (TPDS), 2018. Section 3.2. describes our work on Byzantine-
tolerant atomic register implementation in systems with continuous churn. This work will
be submitted soon. Finally in Section 4.1, we conclude this dissertation.
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2. FAILURE DETECTION
2.1 Failure Detection in an Arbitrary, Partitionable Network Composed of
ADD Channels
In this section, we present an implementation of the eventually perfect failure detector
(P ) from the original hierarchy of the Chandra-Toueg [18] oracles on an arbitrary parti-
tionable network composed of unreliable channels that can lose and reorder messages. Prior
implementations of P have assumed diﬀerent partially synchronous models ranging from
bounded point-to-point message delay and reliable communication to unbounded message
size and known network topologies. We implement P under very weak assumptions on an
arbitrary, partitionable network composed of Average Delayed/Dropped (ADD) channels [19]
to model unreliable communication. Unlike older implementations, our failure detection al-
gorithm uses bounded-sized messages to eventually detect all nodes that are unreachable
(crashed or disconnected) from it.
2.1.1 Introduction and Related Work
The consensus [6, 7, 20, 21, 22] problem in distributed systems requires agreement among
a number of nodes for a single data value. It is an important problem because if we can solve
consensus in a distributed system, we can use it solve numerous other problems like leader
election [1], atomic broadcast [23], transaction commit [24] and clock synchronization [25].
However, the FLP [5] impossibility result states that it is impossible to solve consensus in an
asynchronous message-passing system even if there is just one crash failure. In 1996, Chandra
and Toueg [4] proposed a hierarchy of oracles (failure detectors) to be used to identify failed
nodes, by diﬀerentiating them from slow ones, in a crash-prone asynchronous message-passing
Parts of the material in this chapter are reprinted with permission from:
“Implementing P with Bounded Messages on a Network of ADD Channels" by Saptaparni Kumar and
Jennifer L. Welch, 2019. Parallel Processing Letters, Volume 29, No 1, 1950002, copyright [2019] by World
Scientific Publishing Company
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system. These failure detectors are unreliable and can give wrong information by incorrectly
suspecting correct nodes, and/or not suspecting crashed nodes. In spite of that, many oracles
are powerful enough to solve consensus. However, their implementation in practice requires
some degree of partial synchrony. Freiling et al. [26] provide an informative survey on the
failure detector abstraction both as building blocks for the design of reliable distributed
algorithms and as computability benchmarks.
Failure detectors can be described by their accuracy and completeness properties in a
non-partitionable system. For example, an eventually-perfect failure detector (P ) satisfies
strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy. Intuitively, P can give incorrect infor-
mation about the nodes in the system for an unknown finite amount of time, after which
it provides perfect information about all nodes in the system. Strong completeness is sat-
isfied if the failure detector of each node eventually suspects all nodes that are crashed.
Eventual strong accuracy is satisfied if the failure detector of every node eventually stops
suspecting all nodes that are correct. These definitions were originally for systems that do
not partition. In [27], these definitions of accuracy and completeness for failure detectors
were extended to partitionable networks. The paper by Chen et al. [28] studies accuracy
and completeness properties (quality of service) of failure detectors and quantifies how fast
diﬀerent implementations of oracles detect failures and how well they avoid false suspicions.
Ill-behaved channels make the problem of implementing failure detectors harder. Sastry
and Pike [29] introduced the framework of ADD (Average Delayed/Dropped) channels as a
way to model realistic systems. An ADD channel can arbitrarily lose and reorder messages
but oﬀers some weak guarantees on the delivery of “privileged" messages. Privileged messages
are never lost and there is an upper bound on their delivery time. However, nodes cannot
diﬀerentiate between privileged and unprivileged messages as they are distinguished solely
by the channel. The authors exploit the channel properties to implement P on a fully
connected network. We use these ADD channels as building blocks in our system model.
Papers [30] and [31] have discussed algorithms to perform failure detection on arbitrary
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networks composed of ill-behaved channels using counters as heartbeats for the nodes in
the system. Unlike our approach, the message sizes in their algorithms are unbounded.
Papers [32] and [33] do failure detection using bounded sized messages, but unlike our work,
they assume that the underlying communication channels are reliable.
2.1.2 Contributions
There are two main lines of research in the area of failure detectors. The first one
involves implementing failure detectors as a service in the network topology layer of a dis-
tributed system, on increasingly weaker system models that represent practical applications
and the second one involves finding weaker failure detectors for solving a given problem. We
contribute to the first line of research by presenting a novel implementation of an eventually-
perfect failure detector (P ) from the original Chandra-Toueg hierarchy. Previous works in
this area either perform failure detection using bounded sized messages with the assump-
tion that the underlying communication channels are reliable or the algorithms that perform
failure detection on ill-behaved channels use unbounded counters in their messages.
The motivation for this work is to extend the failure detector for a fully connected network
of ADD channels [19] to a failure detector that uses bounded size messages and works in any
arbitrary network composed of ADD channels in which crashes can partition the network.
We present a novel algorithm that implements P in an arbitrary (partitionable) network
composed of ADD channels that provide very weak guarantees (unreliable channels), using
messages that are bounded in size.
The failure detection algorithm uses bounded sized heartbeats, timeouts and path infor-
mation to determine if there is a correct path (all nodes on this path are correct) between
two nodes. Periodically, every node sends out its own heartbeat to its neighbors. Every
node p has an estimated timeout value for each of its neighbors and if p does not hear from
a neighbor q within this estimated time, p suspects q to be crashed. If later p hears from
q, indicating that q was falsely suspected, then p increments its timeout value for q. For a
node q that is not a neighbor of p, p maintains a set of paths from itself to q. If none of
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these paths consists solely of nodes that p does not currently suspect, then p suspects q.
2.1.3 Model and Definitions
The distributed system consists of a set  of n nodes connected in an arbitrary topology
by links. We assume that every link connecting two nodes in the network is composed of
two unidirectional ADD channels [11], one in each direction. An ADD channel from node p
to node q ensures that at least one message out of every r consecutive messages sent by p is
received by q within d time; however, the parameters r and d are not known to p and q. The
other messages can either be lost or can experience unbounded delays. Nodes may fail only
by crashing. Nodes that never crash are called correct nodes and those that have not crashed
yet are called live nodes. Each node that crashes remains crashed forever. Each node knows
who its neighbors are. Nodes also know the names (ids) of all the nodes in the system. This
assumption is necessary, as Jimenez et al. [34] show that without this assumption, no failure
detector can be implemented, even in a fully synchronous system with reliable links. Each
node has a local clock which generates ticks at a constant rate. Diﬀerent clocks can tick at
diﬀerent rates and can be unsynchronized.
In more detail, each node is modeled as a state machine with a set of local states and a
transition function. Each node’s local state includes a constant neighbors, which holds the
ids of neighboring nodes with respect to the communication graph. An event is either the
receipt of a message by a node or the expiration of a local timer at a node or a crash of a
node; the occurrence of an event triggers a transition for the node, resulting in a new local
state and a set of messages to send to the neighbors. A state of the system consists of a
vector of n local states, one for each node in the system. An execution of the system consists
of an infinite sequence of alternating states and events, starting with a state. A real time is
associated with each event of an execution such that the real times are nondecreasing and
they increase without bound. The following must be true:
 At most one crash event occurs per node, and once a node has crashed there are no
subsequent events for that node.
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 The first state consists of an initial local state for each node.
 Each node p has a local variable clock whose value at real time t is ap  t + bp, for
constants ap > 0 and bp.
 Each subsequent state follows from the previous state by the application of the tran-
sition function for the relevant node.
 Timer expiry events occur at each live node as specified in the node’s transition function
when its clock has the state values.
 Message receipt events occur according to the ADD channel specification: every mes-
sage sent is received at most once, every message received was previously sent, and, for
all neighbors p and q, at least every r-th consecutive message sent by p to q has delay
at most d, assuming q is live d time after the message was sent.
The network is initially a connected graph but may eventually be partitioned as nodes
start crashing. We call this network a partitionable network.
Definition 1. The network graph at time t is the subgraph of the initial graph obtained
by deleting all nodes (and their incident links) that are crashed at time t.
We denote the network graph at time t as G(t).
We address the problem of implementing, with bounded-sized messages, an Eventually
Perfect (P ) failure detector that satisfies the following on an arbitrary partitionable network
G composed of ADD channels. For each node p, there is a function from p’s state to the set
of nodes that p suspects. In every execution there exists a time tf such that for every t > tf
and every correct node p,
 Strong Completeness: for every node q that is disconnected from p in G(t), p suspects
q at time t
 Eventual strong accuracy: for every node q that is connected to p in G(t), p does not
suspect q at time t.
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2.1.4 Algorithm for Failure Detection
Algorithm 1 Eventually Perfect Failure Detector, Variables for node p
Constants:
1: neighbors // list of neighbors of p.
2: T // integer; time between successive heartbeats
Variables:
3: clock() // local clock
4: last_contact[:] // array of clock times for all neighbors, last time p received
// a message about that node; initially last_contact[q] = 0,
// for all q 2 neighbors
5: suspect_local[] // array of booleans for all nodes; initially suspect_local[q]
// = false, for all q 2 . This stores the failure information
// for nodes in p’s connected component
6: paths[] // Array of sets of paths or sequences of node ids. paths[q] is the set
// of paths taken by the heartbeat messages from q to p; Initially
// paths[p] = fpg, paths[q] = fq  pg for q 2 neighbors and
// paths[r] = for all others
7: suspect[] // array of booleans for all nodes; it is true for all nodes suspected
// to have failed or disconnected; initially suspect[q] = false,
// for all q 2 . This stores the failure information stored in
// suspect_local[] and also information about disconnected nodes
// derived from the paths[] variable
8: timeout[] // Array of time-outs for all neighbors. timeout[q] is the estimated
// maximum time between the receipt of successive messages about
// neighbor q; initially timeout[q] = T , for all q 2 neighbors
Our failure detection algorithm (Algorithm 2) implements P over the partitionable
network of ADD channels. Every node p maintains a variable suspect_local[] which is an
array of booleans to store information about nodes in p’s connected component. Since the
network is initially a connected graph, this variable, contains an entry for every node in
the system and initially, every entry is set to false. As the algorithm progresses over time,
suspect_local[q] is set to true for node q if p stops hearing from a neighbor q or if a neighbor
(of p) informs p about q being crashed or disconnected. Node p also maintains a variable
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Algorithm 2 Eventually Perfect Failure Detector, Code for node p
1: Event h timer_expiry_hb i:
2: if clock() = n  T for n 2 N then
sendhsuspect_local[]; paths[]; pi to every neighbor of p
// Send heartbeat with a copy of the local suspect list and the path list
3: Event h recvhsuspect_rcv[]; path_sets[]; qi i:
4: if suspect_local[q] = true then // Neighbor wrongfully suspected
5: timeout[q] := 2  (clock()  last_contact[q])
6: suspect_local[q] := false // Stop suspecting this neighbor
7: last_contact[q] := clock()
8: for all r =2 neighbors do
9: hop_from_msg := Length of the shortest path in path_sets[r] not containing
p or a node u, u 6= r with suspect_rcv[u] = true
10: hop := Length of the shortest path in paths[r] not containing a node u, u 6= r
with suspect_local[u] = true
11: if hop_from_msg < hop then
12: suspect_local[r] := suspect_rcv[r]
13: for each path,  2 path_sets[r] that does not contain p do
14: paths[r] := paths[r] [ f  pg // Append new paths to the paths[r] set
15: suspect[] := suspect_local[]
16: Let Sus be the set of all u with suspect_local[u] = true
17: for all r =2 neighbors do
18: if all paths in paths[r] contain a u 2 Sus and u 6= r then
19: suspect[r] := true
20: Event h timer_expiry(q) i: // The timer for a neighbor expires
21: if timeout[q] = clock()  last_contact[q] then
22: suspect_local[q] := true
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paths[] which is an array of paths (sequences of node ids) between p and all other nodes
in the system. Initially, paths[q] is set to fq  pg for all neighboring nodes q and for all
other nodes in the system. As the algorithm progresses and nodes exchange messages, p
starts updating information about the simple paths to other nodes. Node p also maintains
an array of booleans suspect[] which stores failure information from suspect_local[] along
with extra information derived from paths[]. Its value is set to true for nodes estimated to
have crashed (using failure information from suspect_local[]) or nodes that are estimated to
be disconnected from p (using information from paths[]). If p’s suspect[q] variable is true,
then we say p suspects q. Node p also maintains a timeout[q] variable for every neighbor q
which is used to detect failed neighbors. It is initially set to some integer T , which is also
the time between consecutive heartbeats sent by p on each of its neighboring ADD channels.
Every node in the system sends out a heartbeat message containing the variables
suspect_local[] and paths[] to its neighbors every T units of time on line number 2. The
integer T may be chosen diﬀerently by each node. The smaller the value of T , the faster
the failure detection algorithm will converge, but if T is too small, the network may be
overcrowded with heartbeat messages. The task of finding an optimum value of T is outside
the scope of this work. When p receives a heartbeat message from a neighbor q (on line
number 3), it records its current local clock time (clock()) as the last_contact value. On
line number 4, p checks if q was wrongly suspected (because the timeout[q] value estimate
was too small), p stops suspecting q by setting suspect_local[q] to false and increments
its timeout[q] value for q on line number 5. Then, p extracts information about the rest
of the network from the message from q on line numbers 8 to 14. For all nodes r that are
not neighbors of p, p calculates q’s estimated distance from r and stores it in the variable
hop_from_msg and calculates its own distance from r and stores it in the variable hop. On
line number 11, p checks if q’s estimated distance to r is shorter than p’s estimated distance
to r. If q is calculated to be nearer to r than p, then p adopts q’s information about r
on line number 12. On line number 13, node p goes through all the paths in the variable
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path_sets[] received in the message from q and sees if p is already included in those paths.
If p learns about any path  from r to q that does not include p, it adds the path   p to its
paths[r] set on line number 14.
On line numbers 15 to 19, p updates its suspect[] variables using information from the
paths[] variable about nodes that are no more in p’s connected component. As there are
no paths from these nodes to p, information about these nodes is not received directly. On
line number 18, p checks if at least one path in the paths[r] set has all nodes that have the
suspect_local[] variable set to false. If not, it suspects r, i.e., suspect[r] is set to true on
line number 19.
Lines 20 to 22 implement a timer to detect if neighbors have crashed.
2.1.5 Proof of Correctness
To prove correctness of Algorithm 2, we need to show that the implementation satisfies
strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy. Fix an execution of Algorithm 2.
We describe some lemmas to prove that Algorithm 2 implements an eventually perfect failure
detector for partitionable networks.
Lemma 2 shows that there is an upper bound on the inter-arrival time of heartbeats
at all correct nodes from correct neighbors. Lemma 3 shows that eventually, the time-out
estimates for neighbors stop changing. Lemmas 5 and 6 show that eventually all correct
nodes suspect crashed neighbors and never suspect correct neighbors. Lemmas 7 and 8 show
that eventually the paths[q] variable at a correct node p contains all the paths between p
and q in the final network graph. Lemma 9, along with Theorem 10, proves eventual strong
accuracy. Theorem 12 proves strong completeness. Finally, Theorem 13 shows that our
algorithm implements P using Theorems 10 and 12.
We use a subscript to denote which node a variable belongs to; for example p’s
suspect_local[q] variable will be denoted as suspect_localp[q]. From here on we refer to
nodes that are neighbors with respect to the initial network graph as initial neighbors.
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2.1.5.1 Proof of Eventual Strong Accuracy
Lemma 2. Let p be a correct node and q be a correct initial neighbor of p. Then there is an
upper bound on the time that elapses between the receipt at p of two consecutive heartbeats
from q.
Proof. ADD channels guarantee that at least one in every r consecutive messages sent on
a channel is received within d time. Thus the maximum time between the receipt of two
consecutive heartbeat messages sent on Line 2 of our algorithm at any neighbor q of p is
(r + 1)  T + d where r and d are the ADD channel parameters and T is a constant in p’s
algorithm.
Lemma 3. For every correct node p, eventually the timeout[q] variable at p for every initial
neighbor q of p stops changing.
Proof. Let q be an initial neighbor of p. If q is correct, then Lemma 2 implies that there is an
upper bound on the inter-arrival times at p of heartbeats from q. Since timeoutp[q] is only
increased, eventually it reaches this upper bound and is subsequently never changed. If q
crashes, then it sends only a finite number of messages to p; since p only changes timeoutp[q]
upon receiving a message from q, eventually it will stop changing timeoutp[q].
Observation 4. For a correct node p, the suspectp[q] variable for an initial neighbor q is
equal to suspect_localp[q] at all times.
Let t be a time after which no more failures occur. We call the network graph after t
the final network graph and denote it by G. Let t  t be a time after which no messages
from failed nodes are received.
Lemma 5. There exists some time t after which all correct initial neighbors p of a crashed
node q in G suspect q.
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Proof. Let us assume that q crashes at time tc. From lines 6 and 20 - 22 of our algorithm
we know that the suspect_local[] variables for initial neighbors are set only by the nodes
themselves (i.e., nodes do not update information about their initial neighbors from other
nodes). From Lemma 3, we know that by some time tf , the variable timeoutp[q] stops
changing. So, by time t = (max (tf ; t) + ), where  is the final value of timeoutp[q], p
sets suspect_localp[q] to true permanently. By Observation 4, we know that suspectp[q] =
suspect_localp[q]. Thus after t, p suspects q.
Lemma 6. There exists some time t after which all correct initial neighbors p of a correct
node q never suspect q.
Proof. Lemma 2 states that there is an upper bound on the inter-arrival time of messages
from q to p. Lemma 3 states that timeoutp[q] eventually stops changing. Let the time at
which timeoutp[q] stops changing be t and the final value of timeoutp[q] be  . Thus after t,
p receives a message from q within every  time and thus, p never sets suspect_localp[q] to
true. By Observation 4, we know that suspectp[q] = suspect_localp[q], thus after t, p never
suspects q.
Lemma 7. For all p and q, pathsp[q] is a subset of the set of all paths from q to p in the
initial network graph.
Proof. We do this proof by induction on the states of the execution. We number the states
as S0; S1;    , where S0 is the initial state, and so on.
Base case: Initially in state S0, the pathsp[q] is set to contain only fq; pg if q is a neighbor
of p and pathsp[q] is empty if q is not a neighbor. Thus the lemma is satisfied for the initial
state.
Inductive hypothesis: For all i  0, we assume that the lemma holds for state Si.
Inductive Step: We show that the lemma holds for state Si+1. If q is a neighbor of p, then
the lemma holds as the pathsp[q] variable is never updated. Suppose q is not a neighbor of p.
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If the pathsp[q] variable is empty then the lemma is vacuously true. If the pathsp[q] variable
is not empty but pathsp[q] is not updated in state Si+1, the lemma still holds. If p updates
variable pathsp[q] in Si+1, it is done from information sent in a message from a neighbor of
p, say r. It is clear from lines 13 and 14 in the algorithm that every node p only appends
itself onto the path information that is received from neighbor r. Let r = q  q1      r be an
entry in pathsr[q] variable at the node r before state Si+1. From the inductive hypothesis,
we know that r exists in the initial network graph. When p learns about r from neighbor
r, p updates pathsp[q] by adding the entry fr pg to it, which is a path in the initial network
graph as there is an edge from r to p.
Let C be a connected component in the final network graph G. A node p is called an
initial neighbor of C if p =2 C is the neighbor of any node in C in the initial network graph .
Lemma 8. For all p and q such that q is not an initial neighbor of p, eventually the pathsp[q]
variable contains all the simple paths in G from q to p.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a simple path  from q to p in G that is never included
in pathsp[q] variable at p. Let the length of this path be k and the nodes in this path be
q  q1  q2      qk 1  p. From Lemma 2, we know that each node in this path receives a
message from the previous node in this path infinitely often as all nodes in this path are
correct. From line number 14, we know that each of these paths is appended to the pathsp[qi]
variable of each node qi =2 neighborsp. So, when p gets a message from qk 1 with the path
q  q1  q2      qk 1 in it, it adds the path q  q1  q2      qk 1  p to its pathsp[q] variable. Note
that all pathsp[q] end with p. To makes sure that no cycles are included in pathsp[q], once p
hears about a new path, it checks if the entry p is in it already (on line number 13), if so, p
ignores this new path value.
A node p has perfect information about node q at time t > t if any one of the following
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hold:
 If q is in p’s connected component in G, suspectp[q] = false at t.
 If q is crashed and is an initial neighbor of p’s connected component C in G,
suspect_localp[q] = true at t Note that if suspect_localp[q] is true, then line num-
bers 15 to 19 imply that suspectp[q] is set to true as well.
 If q is not in p’s connected component in G, suspectp[q] = true at t.
In the next lemma we abuse notation and say that a crashed initial neighbor q of a
connected component C in the final network graph G is at a distance k from a correct node
p in C if q has a correct initial neighbor r at distance k   1 from p .
Lemma 9. Let p be a correct node in a connected component C in the final network graph
G. Let q be either a correct node in C at a distance at most k from p or let q be a crashed
initial neighbor of C at a distance k from p. For all k, there exists a time tk such that, for
all t  tk, p has perfect information about q.
Proof. We prove this lemma by strong induction on the distance k of node p from q in G.
Base case: k = 1. From Lemmas 5 and 6, we know that there exists a time when all correct
initial neighbors have perfect information about q.
Inductive hypothesis: Let us assume that all nodes that are at most k  1 hops away from q
in G have perfect information about q after some time tk 1.
Inductive step: Let p be a node at a distance k from q in G. If q is correct, there exists a
path q    p from q to p in G (since p; q 2 C). If q is crashed, there exists a path   p from
an initial neighbor of q to p in G (since q is an initial neighbor of C). Let r be a node on
this path k   1 hops away from q (note, r is an initial neighbor of p). From the inductive
hypothesis we know that r has perfect information about q after time tk 1. Before time tk 1,
r sent only a finite number of messages to p. Let ty be the time when all messages sent before
tk 1 all messages sent before tk 1 that are ever received have been received. All messages
that r sends to p after time tk 1 have perfect information about q in them.
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From Lemma 2, we know that there is an upper bound on the time between two con-
secutive receive events from r to p. Let this upper bound be  . By Lemma 8, after some
time ta, all paths from q to r in G are appended to pathsr[q] and sent to p in the variable
path_sets[q]. So, after time t0 = (maxftk 1; ty; tag + 2), all messages p gets from r have
perfect information about q and contain all paths between q and r in G.
When p processes a message from r after t0 we argue that the value of hop_from_msg
for q on line number 9 is k   1. hop_from_msg cannot be greater than k   1 because
the variable path_sets[q] contains q   which is of length k   1. Also, hop_from_msg
cannot be less than k   1 because r has perfect information about all nodes at a distance
k   1 from r, and so, the estimate for hop_from_msg will discard all paths with length
less than k   1 as they are no more available in G. We also argue that the value of hop for
q on line number 10 is greater than k   1. This is because, by the inductive hypothesis, p
has perfect information about nodes that are k   1 hops away from p in G. So, all entries
in pathsp[r] with length at most k   1 are discarded as they are correctly estimated to have
at least one crashed node in them. Thus, the value of hop for q is greater than k   1. As a
result, the ‘if’ condition on line number 11 is satisfied and p adopts r’s information about
q. By the inductive hypothesis, this information is perfect (note that p adopts only r’s
suspect_localr[q] variable which currently contains perfect information about q).
We still have to show that p’s suspectp[q] variable does not get set to something diﬀerent
(from the value set by the message from r) by a message coming from a node with wrong
information about q. Let us assume that by contradiction, p gets a message from a node s
that is at a distance i > k from q and the value of hop_from_msg for q on line number 9
is miscalculated to be at most k   1. This scenario is possible only if there is a path 0
in pathss[q] with j0j  k   1 that is wrongly assumed to exist in G. However, since s is
at a distance i greater than k from q in G, 0 must have a crashed node in it. Let z 2 0
be the crashed node that s has wrong information about. Since z is less than k hops away
from s, by the induction hypothesis, s already has perfect information about z. Thus the
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assumption that the value of hop_from_msg for q on line number 9 is calculated to be at
most k   1 is incorrect and p permanently possesses perfect information about q.
Theorem 10 proves eventual strong accuracy.
Theorem 10. There exists a time tf such that for every t > tf , every correct node p and
every node q that is connected to p in G, p does not suspect q at time t.
Proof. The proof is direct from Lemma 9.
2.1.5.2 Proof of Strong Completeness
Theorem 12 proves strong completeness.
Observation 11. Let C be a connected component in G. Let q be a node in    C. For
every path  between p 2 C and q in the initial network graph, there exists a node r such
that r is a crashed initial neighbor of C.
Theorem 12. There exists a time tf such that for every t > tf , every correct node p and
every node q that is disconnected from p in G, p suspects q at time t.
Proof. Let C be the component of G containing p. We show that p eventually suspects every
q 2  C. Since originally the network was a connected graph, there was a path from all q
to p in the initial network graph. We separate this proof into two parts:
 q is an initial neighbor of p. In this case, the proof is direct from Lemma 5.
 q is not an initial neighbor of p. Let  be a path in pathsp[q] after pathsp[q] includes
all the simple paths from q to p in G. From Observation 11, we know that all paths
from q to p have a crashed node r that is an initial neighbor of a node in C. From
Lemma 9, we know that after some time t, p has perfect information about r. Thus,
all  2 pathsp[q] have a node r that has suspect_localp[r] = true. When p calculates
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the suspect variable for q on line numbers 15 to 19, the if condition on line number 18
is satisfied and suspectp[q] is set to true on line number 19.
Now we show that this value of the suspect variable is not reversed. Since from
Lemma 8, we know that pathsp[q] includes all simple paths from q to p in G and thus
stops changing and the information about all nodes r is never reversed, we can safely
conclude that line number 18 is always satisfied henceforth and suspectp[q] always
remains true.
2.1.5.3 Proof of Bounded Message Size
Theorem 13. Our algorithm implements an eventually perfect failure detector for a parti-
tionable network of ADD channels using bounded size messages.
Proof. This proof is direct from Theorems 10 and 12 which prove eventual strong accuracy
and strong completeness respectively.
The messages sent by a node p 2  have the variables suspect_local[] and paths[] in
them. Note that both these variables are bounded in size. The suspect_local[] variable has
n booleans and so has size n bits. The paths[] variable contains only simple paths between
nodes. There are O((n   1)!) such paths, each of which can be represented by O(n log n)
bits. Thus the algorithm has messages of size at most O(n! log n) bits. Thus, the messages
used in this algorithm are bounded in size.
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3. CRASH-TOLERANT REGISTER IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Crash-Tolerant Register Implementation in Systems with Churn
As stated in Section 1.1, implementing concurrent data structures is an important service
in the middleware layer of a distributed system. The classical shared read/write register is
one of the most basic concurrent data structure. Many implementations [35] of concurrent
data structures (queues, stacks, fetch&inc, compare&swap, etc) use registers as building
blocks. In this section, we discuss our work on implementing a shared read/write register in
a dynamic message-passing system that never stops changing.
Emulating a shared register can mask the intricacies of designing algorithms for asyn-
chronous message-passing systems subject to crash failures, since it allows them to run algo-
rithms designed for the simpler shared-memory model. Typically such emulations replicate
the value of the register in multiple servers and require readers and writers to communicate
with a majority of servers. The success of this approach for static systems, where the set
of nodes (readers, writers, and servers) is fixed, has motivated several similar emulations
for dynamic systems, where nodes may enter and leave. However, existing emulations need
to assume that the system eventually stops changing for a long enough period or that the
system size is bounded.
The work in this section presents the first emulation of a register supporting any number
of readers and writers in a crash-prone system that can withstand nodes continually entering
and leaving and imposes no upper bound on the system size. The algorithm works as long as
the number of nodes entering and leaving during a fixed time interval is at most a constant
Parts of the material in this chapter are reprinted with permission from the following papers:
“Emulating a shared register in a system that never stops changing" by Hagit Attiya, Hyun Chul Chung,
Faith Ellen, Saptaparni Kumar and Jennifer L. Welch, 2019. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 30, pp. 544-559, copyright [2019] by IEEE
“Simulating a shared register in an asynchronous system that never stops changing" by Hagit Attiya,
Hyun Chul Chung, Faith Ellen, Saptaparni Kumar and Jennifer L. Welch, 2015. in Proceedings of 29th
International Symposium on Distributed Computing, pp. 75-91, copyright [2015] by Springer
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fraction of the system size at the beginning of the interval, and as long as the number of
crashed nodes in the system is at most a constant fraction of the current system size. This
work also includes a lower bound on the fraction of correct nodes that is strictly larger than
the fraction suﬃcient to solve the problem in the static case.
3.1.1 Introduction
Emulating a shared read/write register is a way to mask the intricacies of designing
algorithms for message-passing systems subject to crash failures, since it allows them to
run algorithms designed for the simpler shared-memory model. Typically, such emulations
replicate the value of the register in multiple servers and require readers and writers to
communicate with a majority of servers.
The success of this approach for static systems, where the set of readers, writers, and
servers is fixed, has motivated several similar emulations for dynamic systems, where nodes
may enter and leave. Change in system composition due to nodes entering and leaving is
called churn. However, existing emulations of atomic registers rely either on the assumption
that churn eventually stops for a long enough period (e.g., DynaStore [11] and RAMBO [12])
or on the assumption that the system size is bounded (e.g., [13], [36]). See Section 3.1.2 for
a detailed discussion of related work.
This work shows that it is possible to emulate a register supporting any number of readers
and writers in a system subject to ongoing churn without bounding the system size, for a
reasonable model of churn. This model assumes that, in any time interval of length D, the
number of nodes that enter or leave the system is at most a constant fraction, , of the
number of nodes in the system at the beginning of the interval. The constant  is known to
the nodes. Our emulation sacrifices atomicity when this constraint on churn is violated.
The parameter D is an upper bound, unknown to the nodes, on the delay of any mes-
sage (between nodes that have not crashed). There is no lower bound on message delays.
Moreover, nodes do not have real time clocks. As discussed later it is impossible to solve
consensus in this model.
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This model of churn is reasonable. If every node has a fixed probability of leaving in any
time interval of some fixed length, then the expected number of nodes that leave in such an
interval is a fixed fraction of the total number of nodes in the system at the beginning of the
interval. Moreover, as the system size grows, the allowable number of changes grows. (See
[37] for a discussion of churn behavior in practice.)
In addition to churn, our algorithm tolerates nodes that fail by crashing. In the prelimi-
nary version of this work [16], we assumed that the number of nodes that crash is bounded
above by a fixed constant, f , independent of the system size. That assumption is quite re-
strictive as the system size can grow arbitrarily large. Here, we replace this restriction with
the more flexible requirement that, at all times, the number of crashed nodes is at most a
constant fraction, , of the current system size. Now as the system size grows, the number
of crashed nodes can grow as well. The constant  is known to all nodes.
Our algorithm is calledCCReg, for Continuous Churn Register. It is intuitive, combining
the simple static algorithm for multiple readers and multiple writers outlined above with a
joining protocol and careful estimations of the number of nodes from which replies should be
received for joining, reading, and writing. In order to join, a newly entered node announces
its entry, waits to receive suﬃciently many acknowledgments, and then announces it has
joined, which marks the termination of its join operation. Once a node has joined, it can
perform reads and writes. A node leaves the system by announcing its departure. Each node
maintains a set of changes to the composition of the system, based on the announcements of
nodes entering, joining and leaving. This information is also propagated through appropriate
echo messages and by having each node append the set of changes it has seen to its messages
that echo enter announcements. Each node keeps track of the set of nodes that it believes are
present in the system (i.e., have entered but not left) and those that it believes are members
of the system (i.e., have joined but not left).
When a node p first receives an acknowledgment of its entrance announcement from a
node that has already joined, p calculates the number of acknowledgments it needs to receive
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before joining. To guarantee that information about the system composition propagates
properly, this number must be suﬃciently large to ensure that at least one acknowledgment
is from a node that has been in the system for a suﬃciently long time. The number must
also be small enough to ensure that p will eventually receive enough acknowledgments to
complete the join procedure. The node p sets this number to a carefully-chosen fraction, ,
of the number of nodes that it believes are present in the system.
As in [10] and [11], read and write operations wait for replies from a certain number of
nodes. To guarantee that information about a written value is propagated properly, this
number must be large enough to ensure that the value has been received by enough nodes.
It must also be large enough to ensure that at least one reply to a read operation is from
a node with an up-to-date value. This number must be small enough to ensure that the
operation terminates. In the static case, a majority of the nodes suﬃces. In our algorithm,
node p sets the number to a carefully-chosen fraction, , of the number of nodes that p
believes to be members of the system.
The contribution of this work is a proof of existence of a crash-resilient algorithm that
tolerates ongoing churn with no upper bound on the system size. As we discuss in Sec-
tion 3.2.4, the system parameters  and  and the algorithm parameters  and  must
satisfy certain constraints in order for our algorithm to work. We show that there are values
for the parameters that satisfy the constraints. Further work is needed to find algorithms
that work under less restrictive constraints to, say, tolerate a larger churn rate or larger
failure fraction.
In all the consistent sets of parameter values that we have identified, the failure resilience,
, is at most 1=3, which is worse than 1=2, which can be achieved in the static case. We
prove that worse failure resilience is an unavoidable consequence of tolerating churn, by
showing the problem is unsolvable unless  is at least 1=( + 2).
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3.1.2 Related Work
A simple emulation of a single-writer, multi-reader register in an asynchronous static
network was presented by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev [9]. Their paper also shows that it is
impossible to emulate an atomic register in an asynchronous system if at least half of the
nodes in the system can be faulty. It was followed by extensions that reduce complexity [38,
39, 40, 41], support multiple writers [10], or tolerate Byzantine failures [42, 43, 44, 45].
To optimize load and resilience, the simple majority quorums used in these papers can be
replaced by other, more complicated, quorum systems (e.g., [46, 47]).
A survey of emulations of an atomic multi-writer, multi-reader register in a dynamic
system with churn appears in [48]. We compare our results with RAMBO [12], DynaStore [11]
and the results of Baldoni et al. [36]. It is important to note that the system models in all
these papers are very diﬀerent from one another and are thus, in some sense, incomparable.
The first such emulation was RAMBO [12]. Here, the notion of churn is abstracted
by defining a sequence of quorum configurations. Each quorum configuration consists of a
set S of nodes (which are called members) plus sets of read-quorums and write-quorums,
each of which is a subset of S. The system supports reconfiguration, in which an older
quorum configuration is replaced by a newer one. The reconfiguration protocol handles
quorum configuration changes to install new quorum systems. Reconfiguration is done in
two parts: first, a member proposes a new quorum configuration. Second, these proposed
configurations are reconciled by running an eventually-terminating distributed consensus
algorithm (a version of the Paxos algorithm [49]) among the members of the current quorum
configuration. RAMBO requires intermittent periods of synchrony for the consensus to
terminate. Reconfigurations can occur concurrently with reads and writes. The read and
write operations are similar to those in [9, 10]. The model does not diﬀerentiate between
nodes that crash and nodes that leave the system. The algorithm guarantees atomicity of
operations for all executions, even when there are arbitrary crashes (or leaves) and message
loss. However, liveness of reconfigurations is only ensured during periods when the system is
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suﬃciently well-behaved with respect to synchrony, message loss, and churn. For liveness of
reads and writes, the authors assume that a configuration has to remain viable for 11D time
after it is installed, to allow suﬃcient time for a phase of an operation to complete. They also
assume that reconfigurations are installed at least 13D time apart. If reconfigurations occur
more frequently, read and write operations might be delayed each time a new configuration
is discovered. Liveness of reads and writes does not depend on synchrony.
DynaStore [11] emulates an atomic multi-writer, multi-reader register in a dynamic sys-
tem, without using consensus. The set of nodes that are in the system is called a view. The
nodes start with some default initial view. The algorithm supports read/write operations
and reconfig. Reads and writes are similar to those in [9, 10], with a read-phase followed
by a write-phase. The nodes in the current view can propose the addition and removal of
other nodes using the reconfig subroutine. Reconfig starts with a phase in which information
about the new view is sent to a majority of nodes in the old view, followed by a read phase
and a write phase, which are performed using the old view. DynaStore ensures atomicity
for all executions. To ensure liveness of read/write operations, the algorithm makes two
assumptions. First, at any point in time, the set of crashed nodes and the nodes whose
removals are pending (via reconfig) is a minority of the current view and of any pending
future views. Second, it assumes that only a finite number of reconfiguration requests occur
(i.e., churn eventually stops).
Baldoni et al. [36] study a model with upper and lower bounds on the system size,
known to the nodes. In their model, churn never stops and at most a constant fraction
of nodes enter and leave periodically. They implement a regular register in an eventually
synchronous system. A join_register module ensures nodes join with suﬃcient knowledge
about the system. Its read and write protocols are similar to those in [9, 10]. The emulation
can be shown to violate regularity if the churn assumption is violated, with an argument like
the one at the end of Section 3.2.5.
Table 3.1 compares the results of [12, 11, 36] with our algorithm, considering: the consis-
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Algorithm Consistency Synchrony Tolerates Violates Consistency Failure
Condition Assumption Continuous Churn Condition If Churn Model
Assumption Violated
RAMBO [12] Atomicity Intervals with known upper No, liveness of reads No No diﬀerence between
bound on message delays; and writes needs leaves and crashes
real-time clocks periods of quiescence
DynaStore [11] Atomicity No bounds on message No, liveness of read and writes No Crash failures are
delays requires the number of diﬀerent from leaves
reconfigurations to be finite
Baldoni Regularity Eventual known upper Yes Yes No diﬀerence between
et al. [36] bound on message delays leaves and crashes
CCReg Atomicity Unknown upper bound and no Yes Yes Crash failures are
(This work) lower bound on message delays; diﬀerent from leaves
no real-time clocks
Table 3.1: Summary of our algorithm and related algorithms.
1
tency condition, the level of synchrony needed for the correctness of the algorithms, whether
the algorithm requires periods without churn, whether the consistency condition is violated
if the churn assumption is violated, and whether failures and leaves are modeled as diﬀerent
events.
Baldoni et al. [13] prove that it is impossible to emulate a regular register when there
is no upper bound on message delay. In this case, it does not help for nodes to announce
when they are leaving, since messages containing such announcements can be delayed for
an arbitrarily long time. Thus, a node leaving is essentially the same as a crash. Their
proof works by considering scenarios in which at least half of the nodes fail. they invoke the
lower bound in [9], which shows that emulating a register is impossible unless fewer than half
the nodes are faulty. Their proof can be adapted to hold when there is an unknown upper
bound, D, on the message delay and half the nodes can be replaced during any time interval
of length D, provided that nodes are not required to announce when they leave. Thus, in
our model, there must be an upper bound on the fraction of nodes that can crash during any
time interval of length D. Also, it is necessary that either nodes announce when they leave
or there is an upper bound on the fraction of nodes that can leave during this time interval.
In [50] and [11], it is claimed that termination of operations cannot be guaranteed unless
the churn eventually stops. This claim does not contradict our result due to diﬀerences in
the churn models, since their proofs rely on many nodes entering and leaving during a short
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time period, a behavior that is not allowed in our model. One of the contributions of this
work is to point out that by making diﬀerent, yet still reasonable, assumptions on churn it
is possible to get a solution with diﬀerent, yet still reasonable, properties and, in particular,
to overcome the prior constraint that churn must stop to ensure termination of operations.
That is, we are suggesting a diﬀerent point in the solution space.
3.1.3 Research Goals
We have two main research goals in this area. First, we want to create an algorithm to
implement an atomic MRMW (Multi Reader Multi Writer) register in a system that never
stops changing and can change size. The second goal is to prove a lower bound that shows
that unlike static systems, majority correctness is not enough to implement a SRSW (Single
Reader Single Writer) register in systems with churn.
3.1.4 System Model and Problem Statement
We model each node p as a state machine with a set of states, containing two initial
states sip and slp. Initial state sip is used if p is initially in the system, whereas slp is used if p
enters the system later. The set of all nodes that are initially in the system is denoted by
S0. It is finite and nonempty.
State transitions are triggered by the occurrences of events. Possible triggering events
are: entering the system (Enterp), leaving the system (Leavep), receipt of a message m
(Receivep(m)), invocation of an operation (Readp orWritep(v)), and crashing (Crashp).
A step of a node p is a 5-tuple (s0; T;m;R; s) where s0 is the old state, T is the triggering
event, m is the message to be sent, R is a response (Returnp(v), Ackp, or Joinedp) or ?,
and s is the new state. The values of m, R and s are determined by a transition function
applied to s0 and T . Returnp is the response to Readp, Ackp is the response to Writep,
and Joinedp is the response to Enterp. If T is Crashp, then m is ? and R is ?.
A view of a node p is a sequence of steps such that:
 the old state of the first step is an initial state;
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 the new state of each step equals the old state of the next step;
 if the old state of the first step is sip, then no Enterp event occurs;
 if the old state of the first step is slp, then the triggering event in the first step is
Enterp and there is no other occurrence of Enterp; and
 at most one of Crashp and Leavep occurs and if so, it is in the last step.
In our model, a node that leaves the system cannot re-enter with the same id. It can,
however, re-enter with a new id. Likewise, a node that crashes does not recover. A node
that crashes and recovers, but loses its state, can re-enter with a new id. Because nodes
cannot measure time, a node that crashes and recovers, retaining its state, can be treated
as if no crash occurred.
Time is represented by nonnegative real numbers. A timed view is a view whose steps
occur at nondecreasing times. If a view is infinite, the times at which its steps occur must
increase without bound. Given a timed view of a node, if (s0; T;m;R; s) is the step with the
largest time less than or equal to t, then s is the state of that node at time t. A node p is
said to be present at time t if it entered the system (i.e., its first step has time at most t)
but has not left (i.e., Leavep does not occur at or before t). The number of nodes that are
present at time t is denoted by N(t). A crashed node (i.e., a node for which Crashp occurs
at or before t) is still considered to be present. A node is said to be active at time t if it is
present and not crashed at t. A node p is said to be a member at time t if it has joined the
system (i.e., p 2 S0 or Joinedp occurs at or before t) but has not left (i.e., Leavep does
not occur at or before t). Note that, at any time t, the members are a subset of the present
nodes and it is possible for some members to be crashed
If a message m sent at time t is received by a node at time t0, then the delay of this
message is t0   t. This encompasses transmission delay as well as time for for handling the
message at both the sender and receiver. Let D > 0 denote the maximum message delay
that can occur in the system. Let  > 0 and 0 <   1 be real numbers that denote the
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churn rate and failure fraction, respectively. The parameters  and  are known to the
nodes, but D is not.
An execution e is a possibly infinite set of timed views, one for each node that is ever
present in the system, that satisfies the following eight assumptions.
A1: The first step of each node p 2 S0 occurs at time 0 and the first step of each other
node occurs after time 0.
A2: Every sent message has at most one matching receipt at each node and every message
receipt has exactly one matching message send.
A3: If a message m is sent at time t and node q is active throughout [t; t+D] (i.e., q enters
by time t and does not leave or crash by time t+D), then q receives m. The delay of
every received message is in (0; D].
A4: Messages from the same sender are received in the order they are sent (i.e., if node
p sends message m1 before sending message m2, then no node receives m2 before it
receives m1). This can be achieved by tagging each message with the id of its sender
and a sequence number.
A5: For all times t > 0, the number of Enter and Leave events in [t; t + D] is at most
 N(t).
A6: For all times t  0, the number of crashed nodes at time t is at most  N(t).
A7: If Readp or Writep invocation occurs at time t, then p has already joined but has
not left or crashed.
A8: At each node p, no Readp or Writep occurs until there have been responses to all
previous Readp and Writep invocations.
Assumption A1 states that there is a nonempty finite set of nodes that are initially
members. Assumptions A2 through A4 model a reliable broadcast communication service
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that provides nodes with a mechanism to send the same message to all nodes in the system.
Sending a message to a single recipient can be accomplished by broadcasting the message
and indicating the intended recipient so that others will ignore the message. Assumption A5
bounds the churn and Assumption A6 bounds the number of failures. Assumptions A7 and
A8 ensure that operations are only invoked by active members and, at any time, at most
one operation is pending at each node.
We consider an algorithm to be correct if every execution of the algorithm satisfies the
following conditions:
 For every node p 2 S0, Joinedp does not occur. For every node p =2 S0, if Enterp
occurs, then at least one of Leavep, Crashp, or Joinedp occurs (i.e., every node that
enters the system and remains active eventually joins.
 In the view of each node p, ignoring message-receipt events, each Readp orWritep is
immediately followed by either Leavep, Crashp, or a matching response (Returnp
or Ackp). Moreover, each Returnp or Ackp is immediately preceded by a matching
invocation (Readp or Writep).
 The read and write operations are atomic [51, 52, 53]: there is an ordering of all
completed reads and writes and some subset of the uncompleted writes such that
every read returns the value of the latest preceding write (or the initial value of the
register if there is no preceding write) and, if an operation op1 finishes before another
operation op2 begins, then op1 occurs before op2 in the ordering.
It is the responsibility of the algorithm to complete joins, complete read and write operations,
and choose the right values for the reads, as long as Assumptions A1–A8 are satisfied.
Although our model places an upper bound on message delays, it does not place any
lower bound on the message delays or on local computation times. Moreover, nodes cannot
access clocks to measure the passage of real time. Consequently, the well-known consensus
problem is unsolvable in our model, just as it is unsolvable in a model with no upper bound
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on message delays [5]. In the consensus problem, every node has an input, and every
nonfaulty node must eventually decide on an output such that all outputs are the same and,
if all inputs are the same, then this common output equals the common input.
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3.1.4.1 Impossibility of Consensus
Theorem 14. It is impossible to solve consensus in our system model, even with just one
crash and no churn.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, there is an algorithm A that solves consensus in our
model, with delays in (0; D] but no churn and at most one crash. For simplicity, let D = 1.
Consider an execution e of A in the classic asynchronous model with no upper bound on
message delays, no churn, and at most one crash.
A priori, there is no guarantee that e solves consensus, as A is only guaranteed to work
correctly in our model, but the nodes exhibit some kind of behavior in e. Order the events
in e by their times, breaking ties arbitrarily. Let e0 be the result of changing the time of the
i-th event in e to 1  2i, for all i  1. For all positive integers k, let e0k consist of the first k
steps of e0. Since algorithm A solves consensus in our model, there exists a positive integer
k such that, in e0k, all nonfaulty nodes have terminated and decided the same output. The
view of every node in e0k is the same as its view in the first k steps of e. Thus, all nonfaulty
nodes have terminated and decided the same output within the first k steps of e. In other
words, A solves consensus in the classic asynchronous model, which contradicts [5].
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3.1.5 Lower Bound on Crash-Resilience
In this section we prove that strictly more than a majority of the nodes must be nonfaulty
in order to emulate an atomic read-write register in a system with churn. Specifically, we show
that the failure fraction  must be less than 1
+2
, where the churn rate  is a nonnegative
rational number.
Theorem 15. It is impossible to emulate an atomic read-write register in a dynamic system
with churn rate , if the failure fraction  is at least 1
+2
.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, there is an algorithm that emulates an atomic
register with   1
+2
.
Suppose that  = u=v where u and v are positive integers. Let N(0) be an integer that
is divisible both by u+2v and v. Then N(0)
+2
, N(0)(+1)
+2
, and  N(0) are all positive integers.
Initially, there are N(0) nodes that are initially in the system and members. We par-
tition these nodes into two disjoint sets, S1 and S2, consisting of N(0)+2 and
N(0)(+1)
+2
nodes,
respectively. First, we consider two diﬀerent executions, e1 and e2, starting from this initial
configuration.
Execution e1:
 No Enter or Leave events occur.
 All the nodes in S1 crash before sending any messages. No other crashes occur.
 A node p 2 S2 invokes an operation Writep(1) on the emulated register.
 All messages other than those sent to crashed nodes have delay D.
 The write invoked by p completes by some time tw.
Since jS1j = N(0)+2   N(0), crashing all the nodes in S1 is allowed.
Execution e2:
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 At some time te, where 0 < te < tw, a set, S3, of  N(0) nodes enter the system.
 All nodes in S2 crash at some time tc > te, before sending any messages.
 A node q 2 S1 invokes an operation Readq at some time after tw.
 All messages other than those sent to crashed nodes have delay D.
 The read invoked by q completes by some time tr and returns the initial value, 0, of
the register.
Note that jS3j =  N(0) is the maximum number of nodes that are allowed to enter at time
te. Since N(tc) = jS1j + jS2j + jS3j = ( + 1)N(0), the number of crashed nodes at time tc
is jS2j = (+1)N(0)+2 = N(tc)+2   N(tc), which is also allowed.
Finally, we construct a new execution e3 from e1 and e2.
Execution e3:
 Create a set of timed views by merging the timed views of nodes in S2 from e1, which
contains a write of 1, and the timed views of nodes in S1 [ S3 from e2, which contains
a read of 0. Note that there are no crashes in these timed views.
 Truncate each timed view so that it consists of all steps with associated time at most
tr, i.e. just after the read finishes.
 Extend the truncated views by delivering all pending messages. This includes all
messages sent by time tr in e1 from nodes in S1 to nodes in S2 and all messages sent
by time tr in e2 from nodes in S2 to nodes in S1 [S3. These messages are all delivered
at some time tf > tr. Note that some of these messages might have delay greater than
D. Let V3 denote the resulting set of timed views.
 Multiply the real time of every event in every sequence of V3 by minfDtf ; 1g. This
shrinks the delays to ensures that they are all at most D.
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 Extend the sequences by receiving and sending messages, where each message has delay
D, but without including any new occurrences of Enter, Read, Write, Crash, or Leave.
From the code, the algorithm will eventually finish.
We verify that e3 is an execution:
A1: Sets S1 and S2 are present in the system at time 0.
A2–A4: Consider any message m0 in e3 that corresponds to a message m in V3 sent before time
tf . Since m is sent at or after time 0 and is received at every node at or before time
tf , its delay in V3 is at most tf . By construction, the delay of m0 in e3 is at most
tf minfD=tf ; 1g, which equals tf if tf  D and equals D if tf > D. Thus the delay
of m0 is at most D. All other messages in e3 have delay at most D by construction.
Assumptions A2, A3, and A4 follow from this and the fact that they hold in e1 and e2.
A5: There are  N(0) Enter events in [0; D] and no other Enter events. There are no
Leave events.
A6: No nodes crash.
A7: The read is invoked by p after p joins and the write by q is invoked after q joins.
A8: There is only one read and only one write and they are invoked at diﬀerent nodes.
In e3, the read operation by q returning 0 starts after the operation writing 1 by p
completes, which violates atomicity.
If  = 0, then our lower bound reduces to the requirement that the failure fraction be
less than 1/2, which is well-known for the static case and is achievable [9]. If  > 0, then
the failure fraction has to be even smaller than what is suﬃcient in the static case and it
must decrease as the churn rate increases.
Looking carefully at the proof of Theorem 15, we see that the result holds even for the
emulation of a safe register [51, 52], which satisfies a weaker consistency condition, even if
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only one reader and one writer are supported, even if nodes never leave, and even if there is
a finite upper bound on the total number of nodes.
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3.1.6 The CCReg Algorithm
In our algorithm, nodes run client (reader or writer) threads and server threads. Each
node runs exactly one server thread, at most one reader thread, and at most one writer
thread. We assume that the code segment that is executed in response to each event executes
without interruption.
The algorithm combines a mechanism for tracking the composition of the system, with a
simple algorithm, very similar to [10], for reading and writing the register, which associates
a unique timestamp with each value that is written. A timestamp is a pair that consists of
two values: a sequence number (num) and a node id (w_id) and these (num;w_id) pairs
are ordered lexicographically. Below, the local variables of node p are subscripted with p;
e.g., vp refers to node p’s local variable v.
In order to track the composition of the system (Algorithm 10), each node p maintains
a set of events, Changesp, concerning the nodes that have entered the system. When an
Enterq event occurs, q adds enter(q) to Changesq and broadcasts an enter message re-
questing information about prior events. When a node p finds out that q has entered the
system, either by receiving this message or by learning indirectly from another node, it
adds enter(q) to Changesp. When q has received suﬃciently many messages in reply to
its request, it knows relatively accurate information about prior events and the value of the
register. The fraction  is used to calculate the number of messages that should be received
before joining (stored in the join_bound local variable), based on the size of the Present
set. Setting  is a key challenge in the algorithm as setting it too small might not propagate
updated information, whereas setting it too large might not guarantee termination of the
join.
When the required number of replies to the enter message sent by q are received, q adds
join(q) to Changesq, sets its is_joinedq flag to true, outputs the response Joinedp, and
broadcasts a message saying that it has joined. When p finds out that q has joined, either
by receiving this message or by learning indirectly from another node, it adds join(q) to
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Changesp. When a Leaveq event occurs, q broadcasts a leave message and halts. When p
finds out that q has left the system, either by receiving this message or by learning indirectly
from another node, it adds leave(q) to Changesp.
When a node p receives an enter message from a node q, it responds with an enter-echo
message containing Changesp, its current estimate of the register value (together with its
timestamp), is_joinedp (indicating whether p has joined yet), and the id q. When q receives
an enter-echo in reply (i.e., that ends with q), it increments its join-counter. The first time
q receives such an enter-echo from a joined node, it computes join_bound, the number of
enter-echo messages it needs to get before it can join.
Once a node has joined, its reader and writer threads can handle read and write op-
erations. Initially, Changesp = fenter(q) j q 2 S0g [ fjoin(q) j q 2 S0g, if p 2 S0, and
; otherwise. A node p also maintains the set Presentp = fq j enter(q) 2 Changesp ^
leave(q) 62 Changespg of nodes that p considers as present, i.e., nodes that have entered,
but have not left, as far as p knows. The client at node p maintains the derived variable
Membersp = fq j join(q) 2 Changesp ^ leave(q) 62 Changespg of nodes that p considers as
members, i.e., nodes that have joined but not left.
Client threads treat read and write operations in a similar manner (Algorithm 4). Both
operations start with a read phase, which requests the current value of the register, using
a query message, followed by a write phase, using an update message. A write operation
broadcasts the new value it wishes to write, together with a timestamp, which consists of a
sequence number that is one larger than the largest sequence number it has seen and its id
that is used to break ties. A read operation just broadcasts the value it is about to return,
keeping its sequence number. As in [9], write-back is needed to ensure the atomicity of
read operations. Both the read phase and the write phase wait to receive suﬃciently many
reply messages. The fraction  is used to calculate the number of messages that should be
received (stored in the rw_bound local variable) based on the size of the Members set, for
the operations to terminate. Setting  is also a key challenge in the algorithm as setting it
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Algorithm 3 CCReg—Common code managing the churn, for node p.
Local Variables:
is_joined // Boolean to check if p has joined the system; initially false
join_bound // if non-zero, the number of enter-echo messages p should receive before joining;
initially 0
join_counter // the number of enter-echo messages received so far; initially 0
Changes // set of Enter, Leave, and Joined events known by p;
// initially fenter(q) j q 2 S0g [ fjoin(q) j q 2 S0g, if p 2 S0, and ;, otherwise
val // latest register value known to p; initially ?
num // sequence number of latest value known to p; initially 0
w_id // id of node that wrote latest value known to p; initially ?
Derived Variable:
Present = fq j enter(q) 2 Changes ^ leave(q) 62 Changesg
When Enterp occurs:
1: add enter(p) to Changes
2: bcast h“enter”, pi
When Receiveph“enter”, qi
occurs:
3: add enter(q) to Changes
4: bcast h“enter-echo”, Changes,
(val; num;w_id), is_joined, qi
When Receiveph“enter-echo”,
C, (v; s; i), j, qi occurs:
5: if (s; i) > (num;w_id) then
6: (val; num;w_id) := (v; s; i)
7: Changes := Changes [ C
8: if :is_joined ^ (p = q) then
9: if (j = true)^(join_bound = 0) then
10: join_bound :=   jPresentj
11: join_counter++
12: if join_counterjoin_bound>0 then
13: is_joined := true
14: add join(p) to Changes
15: generate Joinedp response
16: bcast h“joined”, pi
When Receiveph“joined”, qi occurs:
17: add join(q) to Changes
18: add enter(q) to Changes
19: bcast h“joined-echo”, qi
When Receiveph“joined-echo”, qi occurs:
20: add join(q) to Changes
21: add enter(q) to Changes
When Leavep occurs:
22: bcast h“leave”, pi
23: halt
When Receiveph“leave”, qi occurs:
24: add leave(q) to Changes
25: bcast h“leave-echo”, qi
When Receiveph“leave-echo”, qi occurs:
26: add leave(q) to Changes
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too small might not return/update correct information from/to the register, whereas setting
it too large might not guarantee termination of the reads and writes.
A client thread maintains a sequence number, tag, incremented at the beginning of the
read phase and identifying replies belonging to its current read or write operation.
The server thread is simple (Algorithm 8). Each node uses the variable val to store the
latest value of the register it knows about, and the variables num and w_id to store that
value’s associated timestamp as an ordered pair (num;w_id). When the server receives an
update message with a larger timestamp, it updates the value and the timestamp. When a
server receives a query, it responds with the value and its timestamp.
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Algorithm 4 CCReg—Client code, for node p.
Local Variables:
temp // temporary storage for the value being read or written; initially 0
tag // used to uniquely identify read and write phases of an operation; initially 0
rw_bound // the number of replies/acks p should receive before finishing a read/write phase; initially
0
rw_counter // the number of replies/acks received so far for a read/write phase; initially 0
rp_pending // Boolean indicating whether a read phase is in progress; initially false
wp_pending // Boolean indicating whether a write phase is in progress; initially false
read_pending // Boolean indicating whether a read is in progress; initially false
write_pending // Boolean indicating whether a write is in progress; initially false
Derived Variable:
Members = fq j join(q) 2 Changes ^ leave(q) 62 Changesg
When Readp occurs:
30: read_pending := true
31: call BeginReadPhase()
When Writep(v) occurs:
32: write_pending := true
33: temp := v
34: call BeginReadPhase()
Procedure BeginReadPhase()
35: tag++
36: bcast h“query”, tag, pi
37: rw_bound :=   jMembersj
38: rw_counter := 0
39: rp_pending := true
When Receiveph“reply”, (v; s; i); rt; qi
occurs:
40: if rp_pending ^ (rt = tag) ^ (q = p) then
41: if (s; i) > (num;w_id) then
42: (val; num;w_id) := (v; s; i)
43: rw_counter++
44: if rw_counter  rw_bound then
45: rp_pending := false
46: call BeginWritePhase()
Procedure BeginWritePhase()
47: if write_pending then
48: val := temp
49: num++
50: w_id := p
51: if read_pending then
52: temp := val
53: bcast h“update”, (temp; num;w_id),tag; pi
54: rw_bound :=   jMembersj
55: rw_counter := 0
56: wp_pending := true
When Receiveph“ack”, wt; qi occurs:
57: if wp_pending ^ (wt = tag) ^ (q = p) then
58: rw_counter++
59: if rw_counter  rw_bound then
60: wp_pending := false
61: if read_pending then
62: read_pending := false
63: generate Return(temp) response
64: if write_pending then
65: write_pending := false
66: generate Ack response
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Algorithm 5 CCReg—Server code, for node p.
When Receiveph “update”, (v; s; i); wt; qi occurs:
70: if (s; i) > (num;w_id) then
71: (val; num;w_id) := (v; s; i)
72: if is_joined then
73: bcast h“ack”, wt; qi
74: bcast h“update-echo”, (val; num;w_id)i
When Receiveph“query”, rt, qi occurs:
75: if is_joined then
76: bcast h“reply”, (val; num;w_id); rt; qi
When Receiveph“update-echo”, (v; s; i)i occurs:
77: if (s; i) > (num;w_id) then
78: (val; num;w_id) := (v; s; i)
The correctness of CCReg relies on the system parameters , , and Nmin satisfying
the following constraints, for some choice of algorithm parameters  and :
  1  2 1=4  0:159 (3.1)
1 <
 
(1  )3  (1 + )3Nmin (3.2)
  1
Nmin(1  )3 + (1 + )
(1 + )3
(1  )3   1 (3.3)
  (1  )
3
(1 + )3
  (3.4)
  (1 + )

(1  )3
(1 + )3
 

(3.5)
 >
(1 + )5   1
(1  )4 (3.6)
 >
(1 + )(1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1
(2 + 2 + 2)(1  )2(1 + ) 2 (3.7)
Constraint (3.1) is an upper bound on the churn rate and is used in Lemma 17 to ensure
that not too many nodes can leave the system in an interval of length 4D. Constraint (3.2)
is a lower bound on the minimum system size. It is used in the proof of Lemma 18 to ensure
that at least one node is in the system throughout an interval of length 3D encompassing
the time a node enters, thus ensuring that the newly entered node successfully terminates its
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system algorithm
parameters parameters
churn failure minimum join_bound rw_bound
rate fraction system fraction fraction
() () size (Nmin) () ()
0 0:33 N/A N/A 0:665
0:01 0:26 7 0:67 0:684
0:02 0:19 7 0:69 0:701
0:03 0:13 8 0:70 0:726
0:04 0:06 9 0:72 0:737
0:05 0 10 0:74 0:755
Table 3.2: Values for the CCReg parameters that satisfy constraints (3.1) to (3.7).
joining protocol. Constraint (3.3) ensures that the join_bound fraction, , is large enough
such that updated information about the system is obtained by an entered node before it joins
the system. Constraint (3.4) ensures that  is small enough such that for all entered nodes,
a join operation terminates if the entered node does not leave or crash. Constraint (3.5)
ensures that the rw_bound fraction, , is small enough such that termination of read and
writes is guaranteed. Constraints (3.6) and (3.7) ensure that  is large enough such that
atomicity is not violated by read and write operations. Table 3.3 gives a few sets of values
for which the above constraints are satisfied. Both  and  must be small: once  is larger
than 0:04, no failures can be tolerated.
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3.1.7 Correctness Proof
We will show that CCReg satisfies the three properties listed at the end of Section 3.1.4.
Lemmas 16 through 23 are used to prove Theorem 24, which states that every node even-
tually joins, provided it does not crash or leave. Lemmas 26 through 51 are used to prove
Theorem 52, which states that every operation invoked by a node that remains active even-
tually completes. Lemmas 55 through 35 are used to prove Theorem 37, which states that
atomicity is satisfied.
Consider any execution.
3.1.7.1 Proof that Join Protocol Terminates
We begin by bounding the number of nodes that enter during an interval of time and
the number of nodes that are present at the end of the interval, as compared to the number
present at the beginning. (The proof is in the supplementary material.)
Lemma 16. For all i 2 N and all t  0, at most ((1 + )i   1)N(t) nodes enter during
(t; t+Di] and (1  )iN(t)  N(t+Di)  (1 + )iN(t).
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. For i = 0 and all t  0, (t; t + Di] is empty, and
hence, 0 = ((1 + )i   1)N(t) nodes enter during this interval and
N(t+ iD) = N(t) = (1 + )iN(t) = (1  )iN(t):
Now let i  0 and t  0. Suppose at most ((1 + )i   1)N(t) nodes enter during (t; t+Di]
and (1  )iN(t)  N(t+Di)  (1 + )iN(t).
Let e  0 and `  0 be the number of nodes that enter and leave, respectively, during
(t + Di; t + D(i + 1)]. By Assumption A5, e + `  N(t + Di), so e; `  N(t + Di) 
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(1 + )iN(t). The number of nodes that enter during (t; t+D(i+ 1)] is at most
((1 + )i   1)N(t) + e  ((1 + )i   1)N(t) + (1 + )iN(t)
= ((1 + )i+1   1)N(t):
Hence,
N(t + D(i + 1))  N(t) + ((1 + )i+1   1)N(t) = (1 + )i+1N(t):
Furthermore,
N(t+D(i+ 1))  N(t+Di)  `  N(t+Di)  N(t+Di)
= (1  )N(t+Di)  (1  )i+1N(t):
By induction, the claim is true for all i 2 N.
We are also interested in the number of nodes that leave during an interval of time. The
calculation of the maximum number of nodes that leave during an interval is complicated
by the possibility of nodes entering during the interval, allowing additional nodes to leave.
Lemma 17. For  > 0, all nonnegative integers i   1= log2(1  ) and every time t  0,
at most (1  (1  )i)N(t) nodes leave during (t; t+Di].
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. When i = 0, the interval is empty, so 0 = (1   (1  
)0)N(t) nodes leave during the interval. Now let i  0, let t  0, and suppose at most
(1  (1  )i)N(t+D) nodes leave during (t+D; t+D(i+ 1)].
Let e  0 and `  0 be the number of nodes that enter and leave, respectively, during
(t; t+D]. By Assumption A5, e+ `  N(t), so `  N(t) and N(t+D) = N(t) + e  ` =
N(t)+(`+e) 2`  (1+)N(t) 2`. The number of nodes that leave during (t; t+D(i+1)] is
the number that leave during (t; t+D] plus the number that leave during (t+D; t+D(i+1)],
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which is at most
`+ (1  (1  )i)N(t+D)
 `+ (1  (1  )i)[(1 + )N(t)  2`]
= (1  (1  )i)(1 + )N(t) + (2(1  )i   1)`
 (1  (1  )i)(1 + )N(t) + (2(1  )i   1)N(t)
= (1  (1  )i+1)N(t):
Note that 2(1   )i   1  0, since i   1= log2(1   ). By induction, the claim is true
for all i 2 N.
Recall that a node is active at time t if it has entered by time t, but has not left or
crashed by time t. The next lemma shows that some node remains active throughout any
interval of length 3D.
Lemma 18. For every t > 0, at least one node is active throughout [maxf0; t  2Dg; t+D].
Proof. Let S be the set of nodes present at time t0 = maxf0; t 2Dg, so jSj = N(t0)  Nmin.
By Lemma 16, at most ((1 + )3   1)jSj nodes enter during (t0; t+D], so there are at most
(1 + )3jSj nodes present at time t + D and at most (1 + )3jSj nodes have crashed by
time t + D. Constraint (3.1) implies that  1= log2(1   )  4  3. So, by Lemma 17, at
most (1  (1  )3)jSj nodes leave during (t0; t+D] and there are at least (1  )3jSj nodes
present at time t+D. Thus, at least
((1  )3  (1 + )3)jSj  ((1  )3  (1 + )3)Nmin (3.8)
nodes in S are active at time t+D. By Constraint (3.2), ((1  )3  (1 + )3)Nmin > 1,
so at least one node in S is still active at time t+D.
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Below, a local variable name is superscripted with t to denote the value of that variable
at time t; e.g., vtp is the value of node p’s local variable v at time t.
In the analysis, we will frequently be comparing the data in nodes’ Changes sets to the
set of Enter, Joined, and Leave events that have actually occurred. To facilitate this
comparison, we define a set SysInfoI that contains perfect information for the time interval
I. For each node q, let teq, tjq, and t`q be the times when the events Enterq, Joinedq, and
Leaveq occur, respectively. If q 2 S0, then we set teq = tjq = 0. Then we have:
SysInfoI = fenter(q) j teq 2 Ig [ fjoin(q) j tjq 2 Ig [ fleave(q) j t`q 2 Ig:
In particular,
SysInfo[0;0] = fenter(q) j q 2 S0g [ fjoin(q) j q 2 S0g:
Since a node p that is active throughout [tep; t+D] directly receives all enter, joined, and
leave messages broadcast during [tep; t], within D time, we have:
Observation 19. For every node p and all times t  tep, if p is active at time t +D, then
SysInfo[t
e
p;t]  Changest+Dp .
By assumption, for every node p 2 S0, SysInfo[0;0]  Changes0p, and hence Observation 42
implies:
Observation 20. For every node p 2 S0, if p is active at time t  0, then
SysInfo[0;maxf0;t Dg]  Changestp.
The purpose of Lemmas 21, 22, and 23 is to show that information about nodes entering,
joining, and leaving is propagated properly, via the Changes sets.
Lemma 21. Suppose that, at time T 00, a node p =2 S0 receives an enter-echo message from
a node q sent at time T 0 in reply to an enter message from p. Let T be any time such that
maxf0; T 00   2Dg  T  tep. Suppose p is active at time T + 2D and q is active throughout
[U; T +D], where U  maxf0; T 00   2Dg. Then SysInfo(U;T ]  ChangesT+2Dp .
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Proof. Consider any node r that enters, joins, or leaves at time t^ 2 (U; T ]. Note that q
directly receives this event’s announcement, since q is active throughout (U; T +D], which
contains [t^; t^+D], the interval during which the announcement message is in transit. There
are two cases, depending on the time, v, at which q receives this message.
Case 1: v  T 0. Since q receives the enter message from p at T 0, information about this change
to r is in ChangesT 0q , in the enter-echo message that q sends to p at time T 0. Thus, this
information is in ChangesT 00p  ChangesT+2Dp .
Case 2: v > T 0. Messages are not received before they are sent, so T 0  tep. Since v  t^+D, it
follows that v +D  t^ + 2D  T + 2D. Thus [v; v +D] is contained in [tep; T + 2D].
Immediately after receiving the announcement about r, node q broadcasts an echo
message in reply. Since p is active throughout this interval, it directly receives this
echo message.
In both cases, the information about r’s change reaches p by time T + 2D. It follows that
SysInfo(U;T ]  ChangesT+2Dp .
Lemma 22. For every node p, if p is active at time t  tep + 2D, then SysInfo[0;t D] 
Changestp.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which nodes enter the system. If p 2 S0,
then tep = 0, so SysInfo
[0;t D]  Changestp follows from Observation 43.
Now consider any node p 62 S0 and suppose that the claim holds for all nodes that enter
earlier than p. Suppose p is active at time t  tep + 2D. By Lemma 18, there is at least
one node q that is active throughout [maxf0; tep   2Dg; tep + D]. Node q receives an enter
message from p at some time t0 2 [tep; tep + D] and sends an enter-echo message back to p.
This message is received by p at some time t00 2 [t0; t0 +D].
If q 2 S0, then SysInfo[0;maxf0;t0 Dg]  Changest0q , by Observation 43. If q 62 S0, then
0 < teq  maxf0; tep   2Dg, so teq  tep   2D. Therefore teq + 2D  tep  t0. Since q entered
earlier than p, it follows from the induction hypothesis that SysInfo[0;t
0 D]  Changest0q . Thus,
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in both cases, SysInfo[0;maxf0;t
0 Dg]  Changest0q . At time t00  t, p receives the enter-echo
message from q, so SysInfo[0;maxf0;t
0 Dg]  Changest00p  Changestp.
Applying Lemma 21 for q, with U = maxf0; tep Dg, T = tep, T 0 = t0 and T 00 = t00 implies
SysInfo(maxf0;t
0 Dg;tep]  Changestep+2Dp :
Since t  tep + 2D, Changest
e
p+2D
p is a subset of Changestp. Observation 42 implies
SysInfo[t
e
p;t D]  Changestp. Hence, SysInfo[0;t D]  Changestp.
Lemma 23. For every node p 62 S0, if p joins at time tjp and is active at time t  tjp, then
SysInfo[0;maxf0;t 2Dg]  Changestp.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which nodes join the system. Let p 62 S0 be
a node that joins at time tjp  t and suppose the claim holds for all nodes that join before p.
If t  tep + 2D, then the claim follows by Lemma 22. So, suppose t < tep + 2D.
Before joining, p receives an enter-echo message from a joined node in reply to its enter
message. Suppose p first receives at time t00 an enter-echo message sent by q at time t0;
tep  t0  t00  tjp. If q 2 S0, then by Observation 43, SysInfo[0;maxf0;t
0 Dg]  Changest0q .
Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis, SysInfo[0;maxf0;t
0 2Dg]  Changest0q , since q joined
prior to p and is active at time t0  tjq. Note that Changest
0
q  Changest
00
p  Changestp. If
t  2D, then maxf0; t  2Dg = 0 and the claim holds.
If t > 2D, then let S be the set of nodes present at time maxf0; t0   2Dg; jSj =
N(maxf0; t0   2Dg). By Lemma 17 and Constraint (3.1), at most (1   (1   )3)jSj nodes
leave during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 + D]. Since t00  t0 + D, it follows that jPresentt00p j 
jSj   (1  (1  )3)jSj = (1  )3jSj. Hence, from lines 94 and 95 of Algorithm 10, p waits
until it has received at least join_bound =  jPresentt00p j   (1 )3jSj enter-echo messages
before joining.
By Lemma 16, at most ((1 + )3   1)jSj nodes enter during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 + D].
Thus, at time t0 +D, at most (1 + )3jSj nodes are present and at most (1+ )3jSj nodes
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are crashed.
Hence, the number of enter-echo messages p receives before joining from nodes that were
active throughout [maxf0; t0  2Dg; t0 +D] is join_bound minus the total number of enters,
leaves and crashes, which is at least
  (1  )3jSj   [((1 + )3   1)jSj+ (1  (1  )3)jSj+(1 + )3jSj]
= [(1 + )(1  )3   (1 + )(1 + )3]jSj
 [(1 + )(1  )3   (1 + )(1 + )3]Nmin (3.9)
Rearranging Constraint (3.3), we get
[(1 + )(1  )3   (1 + )(1 + )3Nmin]  1;
so expression (3.9) is at least 1. Hence p receives an enter-echo message at some time T 00  tjp
from a node q0 that is active throughout
[maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D]  [maxf0; t0   2Dg; t D]:
Let T 0 be the time that q0 sent its enter-echo message in reply to the enter message from p.
Applying Lemma 21 for q0, with U = maxf0; t0   2Dg, and T = t  2D gives
SysInfo(maxf0;t0 2Dg;t 2D]  Changestp.
Thus, SysInfo[0;t 2D] = SysInfo[0;maxf0;t0 2Dg][ SysInfo(maxf0;t0 2Dg;t 2D]  Changestp.
Next we prove that every node that remains active suﬃciently long after it enters, will
succeed in joining.
Theorem 24. Every node p 62 S0 that is active at time tep + 2D joins by time tep + 2D.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which nodes enter the system. Let p 62 S0
be a node that enters at time tep and is active at time tep + 2D. Suppose the claim holds for
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all nodes that enter before p.
By Lemma 18, there is a node q that is active throughout [maxftep   2D; 0g; tep +D]. If
q 2 S0, then q joins at time 0. If not, then teq  tep   2D, so, by the induction hypothesis,
q joins by time teq + 2D  tep. Since q is active at time tep +D, it receives the enter message
from p during [tep; tep+D] and sends an enter-echo message in reply. Since p is active at time
tep +2D, it receives the enter-echo message from q by time tep +2D. Hence, by time tep +2D,
p receives at least one enter-echo message from a joined node in reply to its enter message.
Suppose the first enter-echo message p receives from a joined node in reply to its en-
ter message is sent by node q0 at time t0 and received by p at time t00. By Lemma 23,
SysInfo[0;maxf0;t
0 2Dg]  Changest0q0  Changest
00
p .
Let S be the set of nodes present at time maxf0; t0   2Dg. Since t00  t0 +D, it follows
from Lemma 16 that at most ((1+)3 1)jSj nodes enter during (maxf0; t0 2Dg; t00]. Thus,
jPresentt00p j  jSj+ ((1 + )3   1)jSj = (1 + )3jSj. From line 94 in Algorithm 10, it follows
that join_bound    (1 + )3jSj.
By Lemma 17 and Constraint (3.1), at most (1 (1 )3)jSj nodes leave during (maxf0; t0 
2Dg; t0 + D]. Also, by Lemma 16, at most (1 + )3jSj nodes are present at t0 + D and so
at most (1 + )3jSj nodes are crashed at t0 + D. Since tep  t0  tep + D, the nodes in S
that do not leave during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D] and are not crashed at t0 +D are active
throughout [tep; tep +D] and send enter-echo messages in reply to p’s enter message. By time
tep + 2D, p receives all these enter-echo messages. There are at least
jSj   (1   (1   )3)jSj   (1 + )3jSj = (1   )3jSj   (1 + )3jSj
such enter-echo messages. By Constraint (3.4),
(1  )3
(1 + )3
   ;
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so the value of join_bound is at most
  (1 + )3jSj  ((1  )
3
(1 + )3
  )  (1 + )3jSj = (1   )3jSj   (1 + )3jSj:
Thus, by time tep + 2D, the condition in line 95 of Algorithm 10 holds and node p joins.
3.1.7.2 Proof that Reads and Writes Terminate
Next, we show that all read and write operations terminate. Specifically, we show that
the number of replies for which an operation waits is at most the number that it is guaranteed
to receive.
Since enter(q) is added to Changesp whenever join(q) is, we get the following observation.
Observation 25. For every time t  0 and every node p that is active at time t, Memberstp 
Presenttp.
Lemma 26 relates a node’s current estimate of the number of nodes present to the number
of nodes that were present in the system 2D time units earlier. Lemma 27 relates a node’s
current estimate of the number of nodes that are members to the number of nodes that were
present in the system 4D time units earlier. Lemma 26 is used in the proof of Lemma 51
and Lemma 27 is used in the proof of Theorem 37. The proofs of Lemmas 26 and 27 are
very similar to each other and are thus presented together.
Lemma 26. For every node p and every time t  tjp at which p is active,
(1   )2  N(maxf0; t   2Dg)  jPresenttpj  (1 + )2  N(maxf0; t   2Dg):
Proof. By Lemma 23, SysInfo[0;maxf0;t 2Dg]  Changestp. Thus Presenttp contains all nodes
that are present at time maxf0; t   2Dg, plus any nodes that enter in (maxf0; t   2Dg; t]
which p has learned about, minus any nodes that leave in (maxf0; t   2Dg; t] which p has
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learned about. Then, by Lemma 16,
jPresenttpj  N(maxf0; t  2Dg) + ((1 + )2   1) N(maxf0; t  2Dg)
= (1 + )2 N(maxf0; t  2Dg):
Similarly, by Lemma 17 and Constraint (3.1),
jPresenttpj  N(maxf0; t  2Dg)  (1  (1  )2) N(maxf0; t  2Dg)
= (1  )2 N(maxf0; t  2Dg):
Lemma 27. For every node p and every time t  tjp at which p is active,
(1   )4  N(maxf0; t   4Dg)  jMemberstpj  (1 + )4  N(maxf0; t   4Dg):
Proof. By Lemma 23, SysInfo[0;maxf0;t 2Dg]  Changestp and, by Theorem 24, every node
that enters by time maxf0; t   4Dg joins by time maxf0; t   2Dg if it is still active. Thus
Memberstp contains all nodes that are present at timemaxf0; t 4Dg plus any nodes that enter
in (maxf0; t  4Dg; t] which p learns have joined, minus any nodes that leave in (maxf0; t 
4Dg; t] which p learns have left. Then, by Lemma 16,
jMemberstpj  N(maxf0; t  4Dg) + ((1 + )4   1) N(maxf0; t  4Dg)
= (1 + )4 N(maxf0; t  4Dg):
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Similarly, by Lemma 17 and Constraint (3.1),
jMemberstpj  N(maxf0; t  2Dg)  (1  (1  )4) N(maxf0; t  4Dg)
= (1  )4 N(maxf0; t  4Dg):
The next lemma proves a lower bound on the number of nodes that reply to an operation’s
query or update message.
Lemma 28. If node p is active at time t  tjp, then the number of nodes that join by time t
and are still active at time t+D is at least
h
(1 )3
(1+)2
 (1 + )
i
 jPresenttpj.
Proof. By Lemma 17 and Constraint (3.1), the maximum number of nodes that leave during
(maxf0; t   2Dg; t + D] is at most (1   (1   )3)  N(maxf0; t   2Dg). By Lemma 16, at
most ((1 + )3   1) N(maxf0; t  2Dg) nodes enter during (maxf0; t  2Dg; t+D]. So, at
most (1 + )3 N(maxf0; t  2Dg) nodes are crashed by t+D. Thus, there are at least
N(maxf0; t  2Dg)  (1  (1  )3) N(maxf0; t  2Dg)
 (1 + )3 N(maxf0; t  2Dg)
= [(1  )3  (1 + )3] N(maxf0; t  2Dg)
nodes that were present at timemaxf0; t 2Dg and are still active at time t+D. This number
is bounded below by
h
(1 )3
(1+)2
 (1 + )
i
 jPresenttpj since, by Lemma 26, N(maxf0; t  
2Dg)  jPresenttpj=(1 + )2. By Theorem 24, all of these nodes are joined by time t.
Theorem 29. Every read or write operation invoked by a node that remains active completes.
Proof. Each operation consists of a read phase and a write phase. We show that each phase
terminates within 2D time, provided the client does not crash or leave.
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Consider a phase of an operation by client p that starts at time t. Every node that joins
by time t and is still active at time t +D receives p’s query or update message and replies
with a reply message or an ack message by time t + D. By Lemma 51, there are at leasth
(1 )3
(1+)2
 (1 + )
i
 jPresenttpj such nodes.
From Constraint (3.5) and Observation 48,

(1  )3
(1 + )2
 (1 + )

 jPresenttpj    jPresenttpj
   jMemberstpj = rw_boundtp:
Thus, by time t + 2D, p receives suﬃciently many reply or ack messages to complete the
phase.
3.1.7.3 Proof of Atomicity of CCReg
Now we prove atomicity of the CCReg algorithm. Let T be the set of read operations
that complete and write operations that execute line 74 of Algorithm 4. For any node p,
let tstp = (numtp; w_idtp) denote the timestamp of the latest register value known to node
p at time t. Note that new timestamps are created by write operations (on lines 70-71
of Algorithm 4) and are sent via enter-echo, update, and update-echo messages. Initially,
ts0p = (0;?) for all nodes p.
For any operation o in T by p, the timestamp of its read phase, tsrp(o), is tstp, where
t is the end of its read phase (i.e., when the condition on line 64 of Algorithm 4 evaluates
to true). The timestamp of its write phase, tswp(o), is tstp, where t is the beginning of its
write phase (i.e., when it broadcasts on line 74 of Algorithm 4). The timestamp of a read
operation in T is the timestamp of its read phase. The timestamp of a write operation in T
is the timestamp of its write phase.
Note that w_id is equal to p and num is set to one greater than the largest sequence
value observed during an operation’s read phase. This implies the next observation:
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Observation 30. Each write operation in T has a unique timestamp.
The next observation follows by a simple induction, since every timestamp other than
(0;?) comes from Lines 70-71 of Algorithm 4.
Observation 31. Consider any read op1 in T . If the timestamp of a read op1 is (0;?),
then op1 returns ?. Otherwise, there is a write op2 in T such that ts(op1) = ts(op2) and the
value returned by op1 equals the value written by op2.
Lemmas 55–35 show that write phase information propagates properly through the sys-
tem. They are analogous to Observation 43 and Lemmas 21–23, regarding the propagation
of information about Enter, Joined, and Leave events.
Lemma 32. If o is an operation in T whose write phase w starts at tw, node p is active at
time t  tw +D, and tep  tw, then tstp  tswp(o).
Proof. Since p is active throughout [tw; tw + D], it directly receives the update message
broadcast by w at time tw. Hence, from lines 38–39 of Algorithm 8, tstp  tswp(o).
Lemma 33. Suppose a node p 62 S0 receives an enter-echo message at time t00 from a node q
that sends it at time t0 in reply to an enter message from p. If o is an operation whose write
phase w starts at tw, p is active at time t  maxft00; tw + 2Dg, and q is active throughout
[tw; tw +D], then tstp  tswp(o).
Proof. Since q is active throughout [tw; tw+D], it receives the update message from w at some
time t^ 2 [tw; tw + D], so tst^q  tswp(o). At time t00  t, node p receives the enter-echo sent
by node q at time t0, so tstp  tst00p  tst0q . If t0  t^, then tst0q  tst^q, so tstp  tswp(o). If t^ > t0,
then q sends an update-echo at time t^  tw +D, p receives it by time t^+D  tw + 2D  t,
and, thus, tstp  tst^q  tswp(o).
Lemma 34. If o is an operation in T whose write phase w starts at tw and node p is active
at time t  maxftep + 2D; tw +Dg, then tstp  tswp(o).
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which nodes enter the system. Suppose the
claim holds for all nodes that enter before p. If tep  tw, which is the case for all p 2 S0, then
the claim follows from Lemma 55.
If tw < tep, then by Lemma 18, there is at least one node q that is active throughout
[maxf0; tep   2Dg; tep +D]. It receives an enter message from p at some time t0 2 [tep; tep +D]
and sends an enter-echo message containing tst0q back to p. This message is received by p at
some time t00  t0 +D  tep + 2D  t, so tst0q  tst00p  tstp.
The first case is when tw  maxf0; tep   2Dg. Since tw + D < tep + D, it follows that q
is active throughout [tw; tw + D]. Furthermore, t  tep + 2D  maxft00; tw + 2Dg. Hence,
Lemma 56 implies that tstp  tswp(o).
The second case is when tw < maxf0; tep 2Dg. Since tw  0, it follows that tep 2D > 0,
teq  maxf0; tep  2Dg = tep  2D, and tw < tep  2D  t0  2D, so t0  maxfteq +2D; tw +Dg.
Note that q is active at time t0 and q enters before node p, so, by the induction hypothesis,
tst
0
q  tswp(o). Hence, tstp  tswp(o).
Lemma 35. If o is an operation in T whose write phase starts at tw, node p 62 S0 joins at
time tjp, and p is active at time t  maxftjp; tw + 2Dg, then tstp  tswp(o).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which nodes enter the system. Suppose
the claim holds for all nodes that join before p. If t  tep + 2D, then the claim follows by
Lemma 57. So, suppose t < tep + 2D. If tep  tw, then the claim follows by Lemma 55. So,
suppose tw < tep.
Before p joins, it receives an enter-echo message from a joined node in reply to its enter
message. Suppose p first receives such an enter-echo message at time t00 and this enter-echo
was sent by q at time t0. Then t00  tjp  t and tst0q  tst00p  tstp.
Now we prove that p receives an enter-echo message from a node q0 that is active through-
out [maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D]. Let S be the set of nodes present at time maxf0; t0   2Dg, so
jSj = N(maxf0; t0   2Dg). By Lemma 17 and Constraint (3.1), at most (1   (1   )3)jSj
nodes leave during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D]. Since t00  t0 +D, it follows that jPresentt00p j 
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jSj   (1  (1  )3)jSj = (1  )3jSj. Hence, from lines 94 and 95 of Algorithm 10, p waits
until it has received at least join_bound =  jPresentt00p j   (1 )3jSj enter-echo messages
before joining.
By Lemma 16, at most ((1 + )3   1)jSj nodes enter during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 + D].
Thus, at time t0 +D, at most (1 + )3jSj nodes are present and at most (1+ )3jSj nodes
are crashed. The number of enter-echo messages p receives before joining from nodes that
were active throughout [maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 + D] is join_bound minus the total number of
enters, leaves and crashes, which is at least
  (1  )3jSj   [((1 + )3   1)jSj+ (1  (1  )3)jSj+(1 + )3jSj]
 [(1 + )(1  )3   (1 + )(1 + )3]Nmin: (3.10)
Rearranging Constraint (3.3), we get [(1 + )(1   )3   (1 + )(1 + )3Nmin]  1, so
expression (3.10) is at least 1. Hence p receives an enter-echo message at some time T 00  tjp
from a node q0 that is active throughout [maxf0; t0  2Dg; t0+D]  [maxf0; t0  2Dg; t D].
Let T 0 be the time that q0 sent its enter-echo message in reply to the enter message from p.
Then tsT 0q0  tsT 00p  tstp.
Note that tw < tep  t0 so tw + D  t0 + D. If tw  maxf0; t0   2Dg, then q0 is
active throughout [tw; tw + D]. Since t  maxfT 00; tw + 2Dg, it follows by Lemma 56 that
tstp  tswp(o). So, suppose tw < maxf0; t0   2Dg.
Since tw  0, it follows that t0 > tw + 2D. If q 2 S0, then teq = 0  tw, so, by Lemma 55,
tst
0
q  tswp(o). If q 62 S0, then, by the induction hypothesis, tst0q  tswp(o), since q joins at
time tjq < tjp  t0. Thus, in both cases, tstp  tswp(o).
Lemma 59 is the key lemma for proving atomicity of CCReg. It shows that for two
non-overlapping operations in T , the timestamp of the read phase of the latter operation is
at least as big as the timestamp of the write phase of the former. Theorem 37 uses Lemma 59
to show that the timestamps of two non-overlapping operations respect real time ordering
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and completes the proof of atomicity.
Lemma 36. For any two operations op1 and op2 in T , if op1 finishes before op2 starts, then
tswp(op1)  tsrp(op2).
Proof. Let p1 be the node that invokes op1, let w denote the write phase of op1, let tw be the
start time of w, and let w = tswp(op1) = tstwp1 . Similarly, let p2 be the node that invokes op2,
let r denote the read phase of op2, let tr be the start time of r, and let r = tsrp(op2) = tstrp2 .
Let Qw be the set of nodes that p1 hears from during w (i.e., that sent messages causing
p1 to increment rw_counter on line 80 of Algorithm 4) and Qr be the set of nodes that p2
hears from during r (i.e., that sent messages causing p2 to increment rw_counter on line 62
of Algorithm 4). Let Pw = jPresenttwp1 j and Mw = jMemberstwp1 j be the sizes of the Present
and Members sets belonging to p1 at time tw, and Pr = jPresenttrp2j and Mr = jMemberstrp2j
be the sizes of the Present and Members sets belonging to p2 at time tr.
Case I: tr > tw + 2D. We start by showing that there exists a node q in Qr such that tjq 
tr  2D. Each node q 2 Qr receives and responds to r’s query, so it joins by time tr +D. By
Theorem 24, the number of nodes that can join during (tr 2D; tr+D] is at most the number
of nodes that can enter in (maxf0; tr   4Dg; tr + D]. By Lemma 16, the number of nodes
that can enter during (maxf0; tr 4Dg; tr+D] is at most ((1+)5 1) N(maxf0; tr 4Dg).
By Lemma 27, N(maxf0; tr   4Dg) Mr=(1  )4. From the code and Constraint (3.6), it
follows that jQrj  Mr > Mr(1 + )5   1)=(1  )4  (1 + )5   1) N(maxf0; tr   4Dg),
which is at most the number of nodes that can enter in (maxf0; tr   4Dg; tr +D]. Thus, a
node q 2 Qr joins by time tr   2D.
Suppose q receives r’s query message at time t0  tr  tw+2D. If q 2 S0, then tjq = 0  tw,
so, by Lemma 55, tst0q  tswp(op1) = w. Otherwise, q 62 S0, so 0 < tjq  tr   2D < t0. Since
tw + 2D < tr  t0, Lemma 35 implies that tst0q  tswp(op1) = w. In either case, q responds
to r’s query message with a timestamp at least as large as w and, hence, r  w.
Case II: tr  tw+2D. Let J = fp j tjp < tr and p is active at time trg[fp j tr  tjp  tr+Dg,
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which contains the set of all nodes that reply to r’s query. By Theorem 24, all nodes that
are present at time maxf0; tr 2Dg join by time tr if they remain active. Therefore all nodes
in J are either active at time maxf0; tr   2Dg or enter during (maxf0; tr   2Dg; tr +D]. By
Lemma 16, jJ j  (1 + )3N(maxf0; tr   2Dg).
Let K be the set of all nodes that are present at time maxf0; tr   2Dg and do not leave
or crash during (maxf0; tr   2Dg; tr + D]. Note that K contains all the nodes in Qw that
do not leave or crash during [tw; tr + D]  [maxf0; tr   2Dg; tr + D]. By Lemma 17 and
Constraint (3.1), at most (1  (1 )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg) nodes leave during [maxf0; tr  
2Dg; tr +D]. By Lemma 16, at most ((1 + )3   1)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg) nodes enter during
[maxf0; tr   2Dg; tr +D]. So, at most (1 + )3N(maxf0; tr   2Dg) nodes are crashed at
tr +D.
From the code, jQrj  Mr and, by Lemma 27, Mr  (1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg). So,
jQrj  (1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg):
Similarly,
jQwj  Mw  (1  )4N(maxf0; tw   4Dg):
Therefore, the size of K is at least
jQwj   (1  (1  )3 +(1 + )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)
 ((1  )4N(maxf0; tw   4Dg))  (1  (1  )3
+(1 + )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg): (3.11)
Since tr   tw < 2D, it follows that maxf0; tr   4Dg   maxf0; tw   4Dg < 2D. By
Lemma 16, N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  (1 + )2  N(maxf0; tw   4Dg). Thus we can replace
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N(maxf0; tw   4Dg) in Formula (3.11) with (1 + ) 2 N(maxf0; tr   4Dg) and get:
jQrj+ jKj  (1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)
+ (1  )4(1 + ) 2N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)
  (1  (1  )3 +(1 + )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)
= (1  )4(1 + ) 2(2 + 2 + 2)N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)
  ((1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg):
By Lemma 16,
N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  (1  ) 2N(maxf0; tr   2Dg):
Thus,
jQrj+ jKj  (1  )2(1 + ) 2(2 + 2 + 2)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)
  ((1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)
= ((1  )2(1 + ) 2(2 + 2 + 2)  ((1 + )3
  (1  )3 + 1))N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)
By Constraint (3.7),
(1   )2(1 + ) 2(2 + 2 + 2) > (1 + )(1 + )3   (1   )3 + 1;
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so
jQrj+ jKj > (((1 + )(1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1)
  ((1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1)) N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)
= (1 + )3N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)  jJ j:
This implies that K and Qr intersect, since K;Qr  J . For each node p in the intersection,
tsp  w when p sends its reply to r and, thus, w  r.
Theorem 37. CCReg ensures atomicity.
Proof. We show that, for every execution, there is a total order on the set of all completed
read operations and all write operations that execute Line 74 of Algorithm 4 such that
every read returns the value of the latest preceding write (or the initial value if there is no
preceding write) and, if an operation op1 finishes before another operation op2 begins, then
op1 is ordered before op2.
We first order the write operations in order of their (unique) timestamps. Then, we go
over all reads in the ordering of the start times, and place a read with timestamp (0;?) at the
beginning of the total order. Place every other read after the write operation it reads from,
and after all the previous reads that read from this write operation. By the Observation 54,
every read in the total order returns the value of the latest preceding write (or ? if there is
no preceding write).
We show that the total order respects the real-time order of non-overlapping operations
in the execution. Let op1 and op2 be two operations in T such that op1 finishes before op2
starts. By the definition of timestamps, ts(op1)  tswp(op1) and tsrp(op2)  ts(op2). By
Lemma 59, tswp(op1)  tsrp(op2). Therefore, if op2 is a read, then
ts(op1)  ts(op2) (3.12)
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If op2 is a write, then tswp(op2) = tsrp(op2) + 1, and
ts(op1) < ts(op2) (3.13)
We consider the following cases:
 Suppose op1 and op2 are both writes. By (3.13), ts(op1) < ts(op2) and thus the
construction orders op1 before op2.
 Suppose op1 is a write and op2 is a read. By (3.12) and the construction, op2 is placed
after the write op3 that op2 reads from. If ts(op1) = ts(op2) then op1 = op3 and op2 is
placed after op1. If ts(op1) < ts(op2) then op3 is placed after op1 as ts(op1) < ts(op3)
and thus op2 is placed after op1 in the total order.
 Suppose op1 is a read and op2 is a write. By 3.13, ts(op1) < ts(op2). Now, either op2
is the first write in the execution and op1’s timestamp is (0;?) or there exists another
write op3 that op1 reads from. If op1’s timestamp is (0;?) then the construction orders
op1 before op2. Otherwise, the construction orders op3 before op2. Since op1 is ordered
after op3 but before any subsequent write, op1 precedes op2 in the total order.
 Finally, suppose that op1 and op2 are both reads. By 3.12, ts(op1)  ts(op2). If op1
and op2 have the same timestamp, then they are placed after the same write (or before
the first write) and the construction orders them based on their starting times. Since
op1 completes before op2 starts, the construction places op1 before op2. If op2 has a
timestamp greater than that of op1, then ts(op2) cannot be (0;?) and so there is a
write operation op3 whose timestamp is greater than that of op1 and equal to that of
op2. The construction places op1 before op3 and op2 after op3.
Thus, CCReg ensures atomicity.
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3.1.7.4 Proof that CCReg Violates Atomicity if Churn Assumption is Violated.
CCReg violates atomicity if Assumption A5 is violated. This is demonstrated by the
following execution, in which large numbers of nodes enter and leave very quickly.
Let jS0j = n and let p be a node in S0. Suppose the following sequence of events occur
before time D. First, a set of nodes, denoted Snew, enter the system, with jSnewj = m n.
All join-related messages between S0 fpg and Snew [fpg take D time, while the rest of the
messages take time D. Thus, nodes in Snew hear from p before any other joined node and
they use n, p’s estimate of the system size, to calculate the number of messages they should
hear from before joining. Thus all nodes in Snew join before time D but no node in S0 other
than p knows about Snew so far.
Second, immediately after joining, some node q in Snew invokes write(1). All write-related
messages between S0 and Snew take D time, while the rest of the messages take time  D.
Snew is suﬃciently large that the write protocol completes for q based solely on hearing from
nodes in Snew. Thus the write completes before time D but no node in S0 knows about the
enters or the write so far.
Third, immediately after the write finishes, all the nodes in Snew leave. All leave-related
messages between S0 and Snew take D time, while the rest of the messages take time  D.
Thus no node in S0 knows about the enters, the write, or the leaves so far.
Finally, immediately after the leaves, node p0 6= p in S0 invokes a read. All read-related
messages take time  D. Node p0 uses its estimate of the system size as n to decide how
many messages to wait for and is able to complete its read before time D by hearing only
from nodes in S0 fpg. Since none of these nodes knows anything about the write, the read
returns 0, which violates atomicity.
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3.2 Byzantine-Tolerant Register Implementation in Systems with Churn
As described in Section 3.1, a shared read/write register emulation provides the illusion of
shared-memory on top of message-passing models. Emulating a Byzantine-tolerant register
requires replicating the register value on to more than two-thirds of the servers. Emulating
a register in a dynamic system where servers and clients can enter and leave the system and
be faulty is harder than in static systems.
3.2.1 Introduction
A long standing vision in distributed systems is to build reliable systems from unreliable
components. We are increasingly dependent on services provided by distributed systems
resulting in added vulnerability when it comes to failures in computer systems. In a depend-
able computing system, the term “Byzantine" fault is used to represent the worst kind of
failures imaginable. Malicious attacks, operator mistakes, software errors and conventional
crash faults are all encompassed by the term Byzantine faults [3]. The growing reliance of
industry and government on distributed systems and increased connectivity to the Internet
exposes systems to malicious attacks. Operator mistakes are also a very common cause of
Byzantine faults [54]. The growth in the size of software in general leads to an increased
number of software errors. Naturally, over the past four decades, there has been a significant
work on consensus and replication techniques that tolerate Byzantine faults [3, 55, 56, 57]
as it promises dependable systems that can tolerate any type of bad behavior.
The shared-memory model is a more convenient programming model than message-
passing, and shared register emulations provide the illusion of shared-memory on top of
message-passing models. In this work, we emulate a Byzantine-tolerant atomic register on
top of a dynamic, message-passing system that never stops changing. Typically, crash-fault-
tolerant emulations [9, 10] of a shared read/write register replicate the value of the register
in multiple servers and require readers and writers to communicate with majority of servers.
For instance, the ABD emulation [9] replicates the value of the shared register in servers.
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It assumes that a majority of the servers do not fail. This problem of emulating a shared
register has been extended to static systems with servers subject to Byzantine faults and
these simulations typically require that two-thirds [58] or three-fourths [59] of the servers
be non-faulty. It is shown in [60] that more than two-third correctness is necessary for a
Byzantine-tolerant register simulation. Byzantine quorum systems (BQS) [57, 61, 62, 44]
are a well known tool for ensuring consistency and availability of a shared register. A BQS
is a collection of subsets of servers, each pair of which intersect in a set containing suﬃ-
ciently many correct servers to guarantee consistency of the replicated register as seen by
clients. Dantas et. al [63] present a comparative evaluation of several Byzantine quorum
based storage algorithms in the literature.
The success of this replicated approach for static systems, where the set of readers,
writers, and servers is fixed, has motivated several similar emulations for dynamic systems,
where nodes may enter and leave. Change in system composition due to nodes entering and
leaving is called churn. Ko et. al [37] provide a detailed discussion of churn behavior in
practice. Most existing emulations of atomic registers in dynamic systems deal with crash-
faults and rely either on the assumption that churn eventually stops for a long enough period
(e.g., DynaStore [11] and RAMBO [12]) or on the assumption that the system size is bounded
(e.g., [13], [36]). Attiya et al. [16, 17] proposed an emulation of a crash-fault tolerant shared
register in a system that does not require churn to ever stop.
Bonomi et al. [64] present an emulation of a server based regular read/write storage in
a synchronous message-passing system that is subject to “mobile Byzantine failures". They
prove that the problem is impossible to solve in an asynchronous setting. The system size,
however, is fixed and mobility, in this work refers to the Byzantine agents that can be moved
from server to server. Baldoni et al. [65] provide the first emulation of a Byzantine-tolerant
safe [52] register in an eventually synchronous system with churn but the size of the system
is upper bounded by a known parameter. To the best of our knowledge, there isn’t much
work on implementing a shared register in a dynamic system with no upper bound on the
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system size and where servers are subject to Byzantine faults.
The first contribution of this work is an algorithm that emulates an atomic multi-
reader/multi-writer register that does not require churn to ever stop, does not have an
upper bound on the system size and tolerates up to a constant number of Byzantine servers
in the system.Although our algorithm requires that there be a constant known upper bound
on the number of Byzantine servers, this restriction is unavoidable as shown in our second
contribution. This is an impossibility result that shows that it is impossible to emulate an
atomic register in a system with churn if the system size and maximum number of servers
that can be Byzantine in the system is unknown to the nodes.
Our system model is similar to the one in [17]. We assume that there exists a parameter
D, an upper bound, unknown to the nodes, on the delay of any message (between correct
nodes). There is no lower bound on message delays and nodes do not have real time clocks.
It is proved in [17], that it is impossible to solve consensus in this model. Churn is modeled
as follows: we assume that in any time interval of length D, the number of servers that
enter or leave the system is at most a constant fraction,  (known to all nodes), of the
number of servers in the system at the beginning of the interval. Our register emulation
sacrifices atomicity when this constraint on churn is violated (as shown in [17]). We also
assume the messages are authenticated with digital signatures [66]. In real world systems
digital signatures in messages are implemented using public-key signatures [67] and message
authentication codes [68]. Intuitively, this means that Byzantine servers cannot lie about
the sender of a message.
Our algorithm is called BCCReg, for Byzantine Continuous Churn Register. It is loosely
based on the algorithm in [17]. There are several challenges with working with Byzantine
servers in a dynamic system. Unlike crash faults, data may easily be corrupted by Byzantine
servers by sending old information, modified information or even diﬀerent information to
diﬀerent sets of nodes while replying to a particular message. Byzantine servers may choose
to not reply to a message at all, even if it is active or they may even choose to reply to
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a single message multiple times. Our algorithm uses a masking mechanism where at every
stage of the algorithm, we wait for at least f + 1 replies from distinct servers before taking
any major steps, to make sure at least one reply from a non-faulty server was received. We
also have a procedure to check if a message from a server should be ignored either because
it sent out multiple replies to a query or because it lied about leaving the system. While
updating the local register values with information from other servers, we need to make sure
that only writes that are confirmed by more than f servers are considered.
3.2.2 Model
Each node in the system is either a client or a server. Each node p takes steps triggered
by entering the system (Enterp), leaving the system (Leavep), or receiving a message
(Receivep). When a node p takes a step, its output can be a message to be broadcast
either to all the servers or all the clients. If p is a client then it also takes steps triggered by
the invocation of a read (Readp) or a write (Writep). The output of a step by client p can
include a response of Joinp (after entering), Returnp(v) (after invoking a read), or Ackp
(after invoking a write).
A node is present in the system at time t if it has entered but not left by time t. The
number of servers present at time t is denoted NS(t) and is called the system size. A node
is active at time t if it is present at time t and has not crashed by time t (present servers are
always active but a client that has crashed is present but not active).
There are four key system parameters: the maximum message delay D, the churn rate
, the maximum number of Byzantine servers f , and the minimum system size NSmin(f)
which is a function of f . An execution of the system must satisfy the following:
A1: At every time t, NS(t) is finite and at least NSmin(f).
A2-A4: Every message broadcast (either to all servers or to all clients) is received at most once
by each node; only messages broadcast are received; if an intended recipient p is active
throughout [t; t + D], where t is the send time, then p receives the message; and the
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delay of every received message is at most D.
A5: For all times t, the number of Enter and Leave events for servers during [t; t+D] is
at most  NS(t).
A6: Clients experience only crash failures and any number can crash. Servers can experience
(authenticated) Byzantine faults and up to f can be faulty.
A7: Reads and writes are not invoked on a client until that client has joined.
A8: At most one operation (read or write) is pending at a time at a given client.
An algorithm is correct if each of its executions satisfies:
C1: Every client that enters the system and does not leave or crash eventually joins.
C2: If a client does not leave or crash, then it eventually produces a response for each
operation (Return for Read, and Ack for Write).
C3: The read and write operations are atomic [51, 52, 53]: there is an ordering of all
completed reads and writes and some subset of the uncompleted writes such that
every read returns the value of the latest preceding write (or the initial value of the
register if there is no preceding write) and, if an operation op1 finishes before another
operation op2 begins, then op1 occurs before op2 in the ordering.
Although our model places an upper bound on message delays, it does not place any
lower bound on the message delays or on local computation times. Moreover, nodes cannot
access clocks to measure the passage of real time. Consequently, the well-known consensus
problem is unsolvable in our model as proved in [17], just as it is unsolvable in a model with
no upper bound on message delays [5].
3.2.3 Impossibility of a Uniform Algorithm with Byzantine Servers
An algorithm is called uniform if the code run by every node is independent of both
the system size and the maximum number of Byzantine servers in the system. Thus in a
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uniform algorithm, for any particular node id p, there is only one state machine that node p
can have regardless of when it enters the system, the system size, or the maximum number
of Byzantine servers.
Theorem 38. It is impossible to simulate an atomic read/write register in our model with
a uniform algorithm.
Proof. Suppose in contradiction, there is a uniform algorithm, A, which simulates an atomic
register and can tolerate f Byzantine server failures, as long as the system size is at least
NSmin(f), for some NSmin and any f 2 N+. Consider the following executions of A.
Execution e1: The maximum number of Byzantine servers is 1. The set of servers in the
system initially is S1, where jS1j = NSmin(1), and all servers are correct. All message delays
are D. The initial value of the simulated register is v. A new client p enters the system at
time te and joins by time tj  te. Client p invokes a read on the simulated register at time
tr > tj. No other operation on the simulated register is invoked. By assumed correctness of
algorithm A, the read invoked by p returns v at some time t0r  tr.
Execution e01: Multiply the real time of every event in e1 by minfDt0r ; 1g. As a result, all
events in the time interval [0; t0r] in e1 are compressed into the interval [0,D] in e01.
Execution e2: The maximum number of Byzantine servers is f2 = jS1j. The set of
servers in the system initially is S2, where jS2j = Nmin(f2) and S1 is a subset of S2. There is
at least one client in the system initially. All message delays are D. The initial value of the
simulated register is v. No churn happens in this execution. Client q that was in the system
at time 0 invokes a write of v0 6= v at time tw. By the assumed correctness of algorithm A,
the write completes at some time t0w  tw. No other operation on the simulated register is
invoked.
Finally we construct the prefix e3 of a new execution from executions e01 and e2. First,
we specify a set of timed views2 and then we show that this set indeed forms the prefix of an
2A timed view for a node is the restriction of the execution to just the events involving that node, together
with the real times when the events occur.
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execution. Let e13 be the set of timed views in e2. Note that e13 includes the write operation
invoked by client q. Truncate each each timed view in e13 immediately after the latest step
with associated time at most t0w, i.e., just after the write by client q finishes. Then append
steps that result in the immediate delivery of all messages that are in transit at t0w. Call the
resulting set of timed views e23. Construct e3 from e23 as follows.
Execution e3: Add to the set the prefix of the timed view of client p from e01 that ends
at time D, but change the time associated with each step by adding t0w to it. For each
server s in S1, append the prefix of s’s timed view in e01 that ends at time D, but change
the time associated with step by adding t0w to it. Append nothing to the timed views for the
remaining nodes (client or server).
The idea behind e3 is to have all the nodes behave correctly through q’s write of v0, and
then have a new client p enter, join, and invoke a read during which time it communicates
only with the servers in S1. However, the servers in S1 are Byzantine and start acting as
they did in e01, causing p’s read to incorrectly return the value v, instead of v0. An important
technicality in the construction of e3 is to adjust the time of steps taken from e01.
In order for the existence of the incorrect read by p in e3 to contradict the assumed
correctness of A, we must show that e3 is the prefix of an execution (otherwise, bad behavior
by A is irrelevant).
We show that e3 is a prefix of an execution by verifying properties A1 through A8. A1,
A5, and A6–A8 are clear.
A2–A4: Every message sent by a node (client or server) has exactly one matching receipt.
We show this in two parts: (i) If the message was sent before t0w, it was either delivered
before t0w (from e2) or at t0w if it was pending at t0w (from construction of e3). (ii) If the
message was sent after t0w: Messages exchanged between p and S1 after t0p are all delivered
within D time (from e01) and all other messages in e3 after t0w are delivered with delay D. All
message delays in e01 are  D and the message delays in e2 are D. Therefore, the message
delays in e3 are at most D.
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In e3, p’s read returns v, whereas the latest preceding write wrote v0 6= v. The value
returned by node p is incorrect and as e3 is the prefix of an execution, this violates the
safety property of the register. Therefore, it is impossible to simulate a shared register in
dynamic systems where new nodes entering have no information about the system size and
no information on the number of Byzantine servers present in the system.
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3.2.4 The BCCReg Algorithm
In [17], all nodes in the system have a server thread and a client thread. This work
introduces a new model where the set of clients is disjoint from the set of servers in the
system, at most f servers can be Byzantine and any number of clients can crash. We
do not allow clients to be Byzantine because, a Byzantine client can maliciously contact
separate sets of servers and write diﬀerent values which results in an inconsistent register
thus violating safety. The BCCReg algorithm is loosely based on the algorithm in [17]
along with modifications to accommodate the new client-server model. It is divided into
two main parts: Algorithm 8 for servers and Algorithm 9 for clients. Algorithm 10 contains
a set of common procedures used by both servers and clients nodes. The server algorithm
contains a mechanism for tracking the composition of the system with respect to servers and
for assisting clients with reads and writes. The client algorithm is for newly entered clients
to join the system and for joined clients to read from and write to the shared register. Note
that the algorithm in [17] is based on [9] and [10].
Each node p maintains a set of events, Server_Changesp, concerning the servers that
have entered, joined and left the system. A node p also maintains the set Presentp that
stores information about servers that have entered, but have not left, as far as p knows.
A server p is called a member if it has joined the system but not left. Client p maintains
the derived variable Membersp of servers that p considers as members. The variables valp,
nump and w_idp store the latest register value and its timestamp known by p. The set
Known_Writes[q]p stores the values of the writes that server q claims to know about.
Algorithm 8: When a server p enters the system, it broadcasts to all the servers an enter
message requesting information about prior events. When a server q finds out that node
p has entered (or joined or left) the system, q updates Server_Changesp accordingly and
sends out an echo message with information about the system (stored in Server_Changesp)
and the shared register (stored in the variable Known_Writes[p]p). When node p receives
at least f + 1 enter-echo messages from joined servers (to make sure at least one reply is
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from a correct server), it calculates the number of replies it needs in order to join using 
and Presentp . Setting  is a key challenge in the algorithm as setting it too small might not
propagate updated information, whereas setting it too large might not guarantee termination
of the join. The algorithm sends out messages that are authenticated with digital signatures.
As a result Byzantine servers can send out incorrect information about everything except
for node ids. Algorithm 8 is run by servers and at any point in this algorithm, Byzantine
servers can modify information about anything sent out in messages, subject to the following
restrictions:
 Server_Changesp: Byzantine servers can only send out subsets of the Server_Changesp
set. They cannot modify entries as each entry in this variable contains a server node
id which was digitally signed by the sending server.
 val, num and w_id: Byzantine servers can modify variables val and num. But it
cannot modify the w_id variable which is a client node id or ?.
 Known_Writes[]p: Byzantine servers can send out subsets of Known_Writes[]p, but
cannot add entries. For an entry (val; (num;w_id)) in Known_Writes[q]p, Byzantine
servers can modify the val and num variables of this entry for node q.
The JoinProtocolp procedure in Algorithm 10 is used by both newly entered servers and
clients to join the system. Once joined, servers can reply to read/write queries from clients.In
addition to that, for all nodes p, there exists an in-built procedure, IsClientp(q) that can check
from a node id, q if q is a client or not. This procedure helps check whether Byzantine servers
are pretending to be clients.
Algorithm 9: Clients might be in the system from the start or may enter the system at
any time. Similar to servers, a newly entered client p, runs the JoinProtocolp procedure in
Algorithm 10 to join the system. Clients treat both read and write operations in a similar
manner. Both operations start with a read phase, which requests the current value of the
register, using a query message, followed by a write phase, using an update message. A
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Algorithm 6 BCCReg—Local Variables for server p.
In-built Procedure:
IsClient(q) // returns true if q is a client and false if q is a server
Local Variables:
Server_Changes // set that stores information about entering, leaving and joining of
// servers known by p. Initially fenter(q) j q 2 S0g [ fjoin(q) j q 2 S0g,
// if p is in the system at time 0 and ; otherwise
join_bound // if non-zero, the number of enter-echo messages p should receive before joining;
// initially 0
enter_echo_counter // number of enter-echo messages received so far; initially 0
enter_echo_from_joined_counter // number of enter-echo messages from joined servers
// received so far; initially 0
is_joined // Boolean to check if p has joined the system; initially false
val // latest register value known to p; initially ?
num // sequence number of latest value known to p; initially 0
w_id // id of node that wrote latest value known to p; initially ?
Known_Writes[] // map from the set of node ids to the powerset of value-timestamp pairs.
// Initially each entry is ;
Derived Variables:
Present = fq j enter(q) 2 Server_Changes ^ leave(q) 62 Server_Changesg
valid_val = value-timestamp pair with latest timestamp that occurs in at least (f + 1) elements
of Known_Writes[], else (?; (0;?))
write operation broadcasts to all servers the new value it wishes to write, together with a
timestamp, which consists of a sequence number that is one larger than the largest sequence
number it has seen and its id that is used to break ties. A read operation just broadcasts
to all servers the value it is about to return, keeping its sequence number as is. As in [9],
write-back is needed to ensure the atomicity of read operations. Both the read phase and
the write phase wait to receive suﬃciently many reply messages. The fraction  is used to
calculate the number of messages that should be received (stored in the rw_bound local
variable) based on the size of the Membersp set, for the operations to terminate. Setting
 is also a key challenge in the algorithm as setting it too small might not return/update
correct information from/to the register, whereas setting it too large might not guarantee
termination of the reads and writes. The fraction  also has to ensure that enough replies
from correct servers are heard so that these replies can eﬃciently mask incorrect replies from
Byzantine servers.
Algorithm 10: The JoinProtocol() procedure helps newly entered nodes to join the
79
Algorithm 7 BCCReg—Code for server p.
When Enterp occurs:
1: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ fenter(p)g
2: s-bcast h“enter”, pi
3: c-bcast h“server-info”, Server_Changesi
When Receiveph“enter”, qi occurs:
4: if IsValidMessage( “enter", q) then
5: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ fenter(q)g
6: s-bcast h“enter-echo”, Server_Changes,
Known_Writes[p], is_joined, q; pi
7: c-bcast h“server-info”,
Server_Changesi
When Receiveph“enter-client”, qi
occurs:
8: if IsClient(q) then
9: c-bcast h“enter-client-echo”,
Server_Changes, Known_Writes[p],
is_joined, q; pi
When Receiveph“enter-echo”, C, K,
j, q; ri occurs:
10: if IsValidMessage( “enter-echo",
q, r) then
11: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ C
12: if (j = true) then
13: Known_Writes[r] :=
Known_Writes[r] [K
14: if :is_joined ^ (p = q) then
15: call JoinProtocol(j)
16: call SetValueTimestamp()
When Receiveph“joined”, qi occurs:
17: if IsValidMessage( “joined", q) then
18: Server_Changes := Server_Changes
[fenter(q); join(q)g
19: s-bcast h“joined-echo”, q; pi
20: c-bcast h“server-info”, Server_Changesi
When Receiveph“joined-echo”, q, si
occurs:
21: if IsValidMessage( “joined-echo",
q, s) then
22: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ fenter(q); join(q)g
23: c-bcast h“server-info”, Server_Changesi
When Leavep occurs:
24: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ fleave(p)g
25: s-bcast h“leave”, pi
26: c-bcast h“server-info”, Server_Changesi
27: halt
When Receiveph“leave”, qi occurs:
28: if IsValidMessage( “leave", q) then
29: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ fleave(q)g
30: s-bcast h“leave-echo”, q; pi
31: c-bcast h“server-info”, Server_Changesi
When Receiveph“leave-echo”, q, si
occurs:
32: if IsValidMessage( “leave-echo", q, s) then
33: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ fleave(q)g
34: c-bcast h“server-info”, Server_Changesi
When Receiveph“query”, rt, qi occurs:
35: if is_joined ^ IsClient(q) then
36: c-bcast h“reply”, Known_Writes[p]; rt; q; pi
When Receiveph“update” ; (v; s; i); wt; qi
occurs:
37: if IsClient(q) then
38: if (s; i) > (num;w_id) then
39: (val; num;w_id) := (v; s; i)
40: Known_Writes[p] := Known_Writes[p][
f(val; num;w_id)g
41: if is_joined then
42: c-bcast h“ack”, wt; q; pi
43: s-bcast h“update-echo”, Known_Writes[p];
p i
When Receiveph“update-echo”, K; si
occurs:
44: Known_Writes[s] := Known_Writes[s] [K
45: call SetValueTimestamp()
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Algorithm 8 BCCReg—Local Variables for client p.
In-built Procedure:
IsClient(q) // returns true if q is a client and false if q is a server
Local Variables:
Server_Changes // set that stores information about entering, leaving and joining of servers
// known by p. Initially fenter(q) j q 2 S0g [ fjoin(q) j q 2 S0g, if p is in
// the system at time 0 and ; otherwise
enter_echo_counter // number of enter-echo messages received so far; initially 0
enter_echo_from_joined_counter // number of enter-echo messages from joined servers
// received so far; initially 0
is_joined // Boolean to check if p has joined the system; initially false
val // latest register value known to p; initially ?
num // sequence number of latest value known to p; initially 0
w_id // id of node that wrote latest value known to p; initially ?
Known_Writes[] // map from set of node ids to the powerset of value-timestamp pairs.
// Initially each entry is ;
temp // temporary storage for the value being read or written; initially 0
tag // used to uniquely identify read and write phases of an operation; initially 0
rw_bound // the number of replies/acks p should receive before finishing a read/write phase;
// initially 0
rw_counter // the number of replies/acks received so far for a read/write phase; initially 0
rp_pending // Boolean indicating whether a read phase is in progress; initially false
wp_pending // Boolean indicating whether a write phase is in progress; initially false
read_pending // Boolean indicating whether a read is in progress; initially false
write_pending // Boolean indicating whether a write is in progress; initially false
Derived Variables:
Present = fq j enter(q) 2 Server_Changes ^ leave(q) 62 Server_Changesg
Members = fq j join(q) 2 Server_Changes ^ leave(q) 62 Server_Changesg
valid_val = value-timestamp pair with latest timestamp that occurs in at least (f + 1) elements
of Known_Writes[], else (?; (0;?))
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Algorithm 9 BCCReg—Code for client, p.
When Enterp occurs:
46: s-bcast h“enter-client”, pi
When Receiveph“enter-client-echo”,
C, K, j, q; ri occurs:
47: if IsValidMessage( “enter-client-echo",
q) ^ (p = q) then
48: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ C
49: if (j = true) then
50: Known_Writes[r] :=
Known_Writes[r] [K
51: if :is_joined ^ (p = q) then
52: call JoinProtocol(j)
53: call SetValueTimestamp()
When Receiveph“server-info”, Ci
occurs:
54: Server_Changes :=
Server_Changes [ C
Procedure BeginReadPhase()
55: tag++
56: s-bcast h“query”, tag, pi
57: rw_bound :=   jMembersj
58: rw_counter := 0
59: rp_pending := true
When Receiveph“reply”, K; rt; q; si
occurs:
60: if IsValidMessage( “reply", q, rt,
s) then
61: if rp_pending ^ (rt = tag)^
(q = p) then
62: rw_counter++
63: Known_Writes[s] :=
Known_Writes[s] [K
64: if rw_counter  rw_bound then
65: call SetValueTimestamp()
66: rp_pending := false
67: call BeginWritePhase()
Procedure BeginWritePhase()
68: if write_pending then
69: val := temp
70: num++
71: w_id := p
72: if read_pending then
73: temp := val
74: s-bcast h“update”, (temp; num;w_id),tag; pi
75: rw_bound :=   jMembersj
76: rw_counter := 0
77: wp_pending := true
When Receiveph“ack”, wt; q; si occurs:
78: if IsValidMessage( “ack", q, wt, s) then
79: if wp_pending ^ (wt = tag) ^ (q = p) then
80: rw_counter++
81: if rw_counter  rw_bound then
82: wp_pending := false
83: if read_pending then
84: read_pending := false
85: generate Return(temp)
response
86: if write_pending then
87: write_pending := false
88: generate Ack response
When Leavep occurs:
89: halt
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system. The other procedures in this algorithm are used to deal with Byzantine servers
and their arbitrary nature. The procedure SetValueTimestamp() checks and updates the
value-timestamp triple ((val; (num;w_id))p) to valid_valp if the timestamp of valid_valp
is higher than the latest known (num;w_id)p pair. The variable valid_valp is necessary
to make sure that before writing any value (learned from other servers) to the register, the
value was seen by at least f + 1 servers. A Byzantine server p may send out more than
one reply for a given message or keep replying after it has sent out a leavep message. The
three IsValidMessage() procedures deal with these situations. They check to make sure that
only one reply from each server for a message is processed by all nodes. They also check
whether the sender q has already sent a leaveq message. Reads and writes invoked by Byzan-
tine servers are ignored by correct servers by the IsClient() checks on Lines 35 and 37 in
Algorithm 9.
The correctness of BCCReg relies on the system parameters , f , and NSmin satisfying
the following constraints, for some choice of algorithm parameters  and :
  1  2 1=4  0:159 (3.14)
1  (1  )3NSmin   2f (3.15)
  1 + 2f
(1  )3NSmin +
(1 + )3
(1  )3   1 (3.16)
  (1  )
3
(1 + )3
  f
(1 + )3NSmin
(3.17)
  (1  )
3
(1 + )2
  f
(1 + )2NSmin
(3.18)
 >
(1 + )5   1 + 2f=NSmin
(1  )4   f=NSmin (3.19)
 >
(1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1 + (1 + 3f)=NSmin
[(2 + 2 + 2)(1  )2(1 + ) 2]  2f=NSmin (3.20)
Constraint (3.14) is an upper bound on the churn rate to ensure that not too many
servers can leave the system in an interval of length 4D. Constraint (3.15) is a lower bound
on the minimum system size to ensure that at least f + 1 correct servers are in the system
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Algorithm 10 BCCReg—Procedures used by client/server p
Procedure JoinProtocol(j)
90: enter_echo_counter ++
91: if (j = true) ^ (join_bound = 0) then
92: enter_echo_from_joined_counter ++
93: if enter_echo_from_joined_counter > f then
94: join_bound :=   jPresentj
95: if enter_echo_counterjoin_bound>0 then
96: is_joined := true
97: if IsClient(p) then
98: generate Joinedp response
99: else
100: Server_Changes := Server_Changes [ fjoin(p)g
101: s-bcast h“joined”, pi
102: c-bcast h“server-info”, Server_Changesi
Procedure SetValueTimestamp()
103: if valid_val 6=? then
104: if timestamp of valid_val > (num;w_id) then
105: (val; num;w_id) := valid_val
106: Known_Writes[p] := Known_Writes[p][
f(val; num;w_id)g
Procedure IsValidMessage( type, r)
107: if type = (“enter"_ “joined"_“leave") ^ (leave(r) =2 Server_Changes) then
108: return true if this is the first type message received from r,
else return false
Procedure IsValidMessage( type, q, r)
109: if type = (“enter-echo" _ “enter_client-echo" _
“joined-echo" _ “leave-echo")
^ (leave(r) =2 Server_Changes) then
110: return true if this is the first type message for q received from r,
else return false
Procedure IsValidMessage( type, q, tag, r)
111: if type = (“reply" _ “ack") ^ (leave(r) =2 Server_Changes) then
112: return true if this is the first type message for q with sequence tag received
from r, else return false
.
84
throughout an interval of length 3D encompassing the time a node enters, thus ensuring that
the newly entered node successfully terminates its joining protocol. Constraint (3.16) ensures
that the join_bound fraction, , is large enough such that updated information about the
system is obtained by an entered node before it joins the system. Constraint (3.17) ensures
that  is small enough such that for all entered nodes, a join operation terminates if the
entered node is not Byzantine or it does not leave or crash. Constraint (3.18) ensures that
the rw_bound fraction, , is small enough such that termination of reads and writes is
guaranteed. Constraints (3.19) and (3.20) ensure that  is large enough such that atomicity
is not violated by read and write operations. above constraints are satisfied. In all consistent
sets of parameters, the churn rate  is never more than 0:05. The algorithm can tolerate
any size of f as long as NSmin is proportionally big. Table 3.3 provides a few sets of
values for system parameters f ,NSmin and  and algorithm parameters  and  that satisfy
Constraints 3.14 to 3.20
BCCReg violates atomicity if Assumption A5 is violated.
3.2.5 Correctness Proof of BCCReg
We will show that BCCReg satisfies the properties C1 to C3 listed at the end of Sec-
tion 3.2.2. Lemmas 39 through 46 are used to prove Theorem 47, which states that every
client and any correct server eventually joins, provided it does not crash or leave. Lemmas 49
through 51 are used to prove Theorem 52, which states that every operation invoked by a
client that remains active eventually completes. Lemmas 55 through 35 are used to prove
Theorem 37, which states that atomicity is satisfied.
Consider any execution. We begin by bounding the number of servers that enter during
an interval of time and the number of servers that are present at the end of the interval, as
compared to the number present at the beginning.
Lemmas 39 and 40 bound the maximum number of servers that can enter and/or leave the
system in any interval of time. Lemma 41 proves that at least f+1 correct servers are active
throughout any interval of length 3D. This lemma is necessary to ensure that at all times,
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system algorithm
parameters parameters
maximum minimum churn join_bound rw_bound
failures system rate fraction fraction
(f) size (NSmin) () () ()
1 8 0 N/A 0:86
1 10 0:01 0:82 0:84
1 13 0:02 0:79 0:80
1 190 0:05 0:79 0:80
2 19 0:01 0:80 0:83
2 24 0:02 0:81 0:82
2 347 0:05 0:70 0:77
5 44 0:01 0:80 0:83
5 57 0:02 0:79 0:82
5 826 0:05 0:79 0:82
10 85 0:01 0:80 0:83
10 113 0:02 0:79 0:82
10 1630 0:05 0:79 0:82
100 838 0:01 0:79 0:82
100 1107 0:02 0:79 0:82
100 16015 0:05 0:79 0:82
1000 8360 0:01 0:79 0:82
1000 11042 0:02 0:79 0:82
1000 159935 0:05 0:79 0:82
Table 3.3: Values for the BCCReg parameters that satisfy constraints (3.14) to (3.20)
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an active node (client or server) that expects replies, hears back from at least f + 1 correct
servers in order to mask the bad information sent by Byzantine servers. Lemmas 44 to 46
show that information about correct servers entering, joining, and leaving is propagated
to active clients and correct servers properly, via the Server_Changes sets. Lemmas 39
through 46 are used to prove Theorem 47 which states that every client and every correct
server eventually completes the join protocol in Algorithm 10, provided it does not crash or
leave.
3.2.5.1 Proof that Join Protocol Terminates
Lemma 39. For all i 2 N and all t  0, at most ((1 + )i   1)NS(t) servers enter during
(t; t+Di] and (1  )iNS(t)  NS(t+Di)  (1 + )iNS(t).
Refer to Lemma 16 for the proof. We are also interested in the number of servers that
leave during an interval of time. The calculation of the maximum number of servers that leave
during an interval is complicated by the possibility of servers entering during the interval,
allowing additional servers to leave.
Lemma 40. For  > 0, all nonnegative integers i   1= log2(1  ) and every time t  0,
at most (1  (1  )i)NS(t) servers leave during (t; t+Di].
Refer to Lemma 17 for the proof.
Recall that a server is active at time t if it has entered by time t, but has not left by time
t. The next lemma shows that there are f +1 correct servers that remain active throughout
any interval of length 3D.
Lemma 41. For every t > 0, at least f +1 correct servers are active throughout [maxf0; t 
2Dg; t+D].
Proof. Let S be the set of servers present at time t0 = maxf0; t   2Dg, so jSj = NS(t0) 
NSmin. Constraint (3.14) implies that  1= log2(1  )  4  3. So, by Lemma 40, at most
(1   (1   )3)jSj servers leave during (t0; t + D] and there are at least (1   )3jSj servers
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present throughtout time interval (t0; t + D]. At any point in time, there are at most f
Byzantine servers in the system. Thus, at least
(1  )3jSj   f  (1  )3NSmin   f
correct servers in S are active at time t+D. By Constraint (3.15), (1 )3NSmin  f 
f + 1, so at least f + 1 correct servers in S are still active at time t+D.
Below, a local variable name is superscripted with t to denote the value of that variable
at time t; e.g., vtp is the value of node p’s local variable v at time t.
In the analysis, we will frequently be comparing the data in nodes’ Server_Changes sets
to the set of Enter, Joined, and Leave events that have actually occurred. To facilitate
this comparison, we define a set SysInfoI that contains perfect information about correct
servers for the time interval I. For each server q, let teq, and t`q be the times when the events
Enterq, and Leaveq occur, and let tjq be the time when server q sends out a joined message.
Similarly, for each client q, let teq, tjq, and t`q be the times when the events Enterq, Joinedq,
and Leaveq occur, respectively.
Recall that S0 is the set of servers that were in the system initially. If q 2 S0, then we
set teq = tjq = 0. Then we have:
SysInfoI = fenter(q) j teq 2 Ig [ fjoin(q) j tjq 2 Ig [ fleave(q) j t`q 2 Ig:
In particular,
SysInfo[0;0] = fenter(q) j q 2 S0g [ fjoin(q) j q 2 S0g:
Since a client or correct server p that is active throughout [tep; t+D] directly receives all
enter, joined, and leave messages broadcast by active clients or correct servers during [tep; t],
within D time, we have:
Observation 42. For every client and any correct server p and all times t  tep, if p is
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active at time t+D, then SysInfo[t
e
p;t]  Changest+Dp .
Let C0 be the set of clients that are in the system initially. By assumption, for every
node p 2 S0 [ C0, SysInfo[0;0]  Server_Changes0p, and hence Observation 42 implies:
Observation 43. For every client and any correct server p 2 S0 [C0, if p is active at time
t  0, then SysInfo[0;maxf0;t Dg]  Changestp.
The purpose of Lemmas 44, 45, and 46 is to show that information about servers entering,
joining, and leaving is propagated properly, via the Server_Changes sets. From now on,
enter messages refer to both enter and enter-client messages and enter-echoes refer to both
enter-echoes and enter-client-echoes.
Lemma 44. Suppose that, at time T 00, a client or correct server p =2 S0 [ C0 receives an
enter-echo message from a correct server q sent at time T 0 in reply to an enter message
from p. Let T be any time such that maxf0; T 00   2Dg  T  tep. Suppose p is active at
time T + 2D and q is active throughout [U; T + D], where U  maxf0; T 00   2Dg. Then
SysInfo(U;T ]  Server_ChangesT+2Dp .
Proof. The proof is adapted from Lemma 21 to include Byzantine servers.
Lemma 45. For every client and any correct server p, if p is active at time t  tep + 2D,
then SysInfo[0;t D]  Changestp.
Proof. The proof is adapted from Lemma 22 to include Byzantine servers.
Lemma 46. For every client and any correct server p 62 S0 [ C0, if p joins at time tjp and
is active at time t  tjp, then SysInfo[0;maxf0;t 2Dg]  Changestp.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which clients and correct servers join the
system. Let p 62 S0 [ C0 be a client or correct server that joins at time tjp  t and suppose
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the claim holds for all clients and correct servers that join before p. If t  tep + 2D, then the
claim follows by Lemma 45. So, suppose t < tep + 2D.
Before joining, p receives f+1 enter-echo message from joined servers in reply to its enter
message (Line number 93). Out of these, at most f can be from Byzantine servers. Thus,
at least one reply is from a correct server. Suppose p receives the first enter-echo message at
time t00 sent by correct server q at time t0; tep  t0  t00  tjp. From Lemma 45, we know that
this message from q has a perfect information about the Server_Changest
0 2D set. This in
turn means that it has perfect information about the derived set Presentt0 2D. Byzantine
servers can only modify the information about the Server_Changes set by sending a subset
of its Server_Changes set. So, when node p receives at least one reply is from a correct
server, the incomplete information sent by Byzantine servers is overshadowed by this one
reply from q and thus p has a perfect information about Presentt
0 2D.
If correct server q 2 S0, then by Observation 43, SysInfo[0;maxf0;t0 Dg]  Changest0q .
Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis, SysInfo[0;maxf0;t
0 2Dg]  Changest0q , since q joined
prior to p and is active at time t0  tjq. Note that Server_Changest
0
q  Server_Changest
00
p
 Server_Changestp. If t  2D, then maxf0; t  2Dg = 0 and the claim holds.
If t > 2D, then let S be the set of servers present at time maxf0; t0   2Dg; jSj =
N(maxf0; t0   2Dg). By Lemma 40 and Constraint (3.14), at most (1  (1  )3)jSj servers
leave during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 + D]. Since t00  t0 + D, it follows that jPresentt00p j 
jSj   (1  (1  )3)jSj = (1  )3jSj. Hence, from lines 94 and 95 of Algorithm 10, p waits
until it has received at least join_bound =  jPresentt00p j   (1 )3jSj enter-echo messages
before joining.
By Lemma 39, at most ((1 + )3   1)jSj servers enter during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D].
Thus, at time t0+D, at most (1+)3jSj servers are present, at most f of which are Byzantine.
Hence, the number of enter-echo messages p receives before joining from servers that were
active throughout [maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D] is join_bound minus the total number of server
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enters, leaves and faults (as Byzantine servers may not reply at all), which is at least
  (1  )3jSj   [((1 + )3   1)jSj+ (1  (1  )3)jSj+ f ]
= [(1 + )(1  )3   (1 + )3]jSj   f  [(1 + )(1  )3   (1 + )3]NSmin   f (3.21)
Rearranging Constraint (3.16), we get
[(1 + )(1  )3   (1 + )3]NSmin   f  f + 1;
so expression (3.21) is at least f + 1. Hence p receives an enter-echo message at some time
T 00  tjp from a correct server q0 that is active throughout
[maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D]  [maxf0; t0   2Dg; t D]:
Let T 0 be the time that q0 sent its enter-echo message in reply to the enter message from p.
Applying Lemma 44 for q0, with U = maxf0; t0   2Dg, and T = t  2D gives
SysInfo(maxf0;t0 2Dg;t 2D]  Server_Changestp.
Thus, we get SysInfo[0;t 2D] = SysInfo[0;maxf0;t0 2Dg][ SysInfo(maxf0;t0 2Dg;t 2D]
 Server_Changestp.
Next we prove that every client and any correct server that remains active suﬃciently
long after it enters, will succeed in joining.
Theorem 47. Every client and any correct server p 62 S0[C0 that is active at time tep+2D
joins by time tep + 2D.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which clients and correct servers enter the
system. Let p 62 S0 [ C0 be a client or correct server that enters at time tep and is active at
time tep + 2D. Suppose the claim holds for all client and correct servers that enter before p.
By Lemma 41, there are f + 1 correct servers that are active throughout [maxftep  
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2D; 0g; tep + D]. Let q be one such server. If q 2 S0, then q joins at time 0. If not, then
teq  tep  2D, so, by the induction hypothesis, q joins by time teq +2D  tep. Since q is active
at time tep+D, it receives the enter message from p during [tep; tep+D] and sends an enter-echo
message in reply. Since p is active at time tep + 2D, it receives the enter-echo message from
q by time tep + 2D. Hence, by time tep + 2D, p receives at least one enter-echo message from
a correct joined server in reply to its enter message.
Suppose the first enter-echo message p receives from a correct joined server in reply to
its enter message is sent by server q0 at time t0 and received by p at time t00. By Lemma 46,
SysInfo[0;maxf0;t
0 2Dg]  Changest0q0  Server_Changest
00
p .
Let S be the set of servers present at time maxf0; t0   2Dg. Since t00  t0 +D, it follows
from Lemma 39 that at most ((1 + )3   1)jSj servers enter during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t00].
Thus, jPresentt00p j  jSj+ ((1 + )3   1)jSj = (1 + )3jSj. From line 94 in Algorithm 10, it
follows that join_bound    (1 + )3jSj.
By Lemma 40 and Constraint (3.14), at most (1   (1   )3)jSj servers leave during
(maxf0; t0  2Dg; t0 +D]. At most f servers are Byzantine at t0 +D. Since tep  t0  tep +D,
the servers in S that do not leave during (maxf0; t0   2Dg; t0 +D] and are not Byzantine at
t0 +D are active throughout [tep; tep +D] and send enter-echo messages in reply to p’s enter
message. By time tep + 2D, p receives all these enter-echo messages. There are at least
jSj   (1  (1  )3)jSj   f = (1  )3jSj   f
such enter-echo messages. By Constraint (3.17),
(1  )3
(1 + )3
  f
(1 + )3NSmin
 ;
92
so the value of join_bound is at most
  (1 + )3jSj 

(1  )3
(1 + )3
  f
(1 + )3NSmin

 (1 + )3jSj = (1   )3jSj   f:
Thus, by time tep+2D, the condition in line 95 of Algorithm 10 holds and node p joins.
3.2.5.2 Proof that Reads and Writes by Clients Terminate
Next, we show that all read and write operations terminate. Specifically, we show that
the number of replies for which an operation waits is at most the number that it is guaranteed
to receive.
Since enter(q) is added to Server_Changesp whenever join(q) is, for server q, we get the
following observation.
Observation 48. For every time t  0 and every client p that is active at time t, Memberstp 
Presenttp.
Lemma 49 relates a node’s current estimate of the number of servers present to the
number of servers that were present in the system 2D time units earlier. Lemma 50 relates a
client’s current estimate of the number of servers that are members to the number of servers
that were present in the system 4D time units earlier. Lemma 49 is used in the proof of
Lemma 51 and Lemma 50 is used in the proof of Theorem 60.
Lemma 49. For every client and any correct server p and every time t  tjp at which p is
active,
(1   )2  N(maxf0; t   2Dg)   f  jPresenttpj  (1 + )2  N(maxf0; t   2Dg):
Proof. The proof is adapted from Lemma 26 to include f Byzantine servers in the lower
bound.
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Lemma 50. For every client p and every time t  tjp at which p is active,
(1   )4  N(maxf0; t   4Dg)   f  jMemberstpj  (1 + )4  N(maxf0; t   4Dg):
Proof. The proof is adapted from Lemma 27 to include f Byzantine servers in the lower
bound.
The next lemma proves a lower bound on the number of servers that reply to a client’s
query or update message.
Lemma 51. If a client or correct server p is active at time t  tjp, then the number of
correct servers that are joined by time t and are still active at time t+D is at least
h
(1 )3
(1+)2
i

jPresenttpj   f .
Proof. By Lemma 40 and Constraint (3.14), the maximum number of servers that leave
during (maxf0; t   2Dg; t +D] is at most (1   (1   )3)  N(maxf0; t   2Dg). Thus, there
are at least
N(maxf0; t  2Dg)  (1  (1  )3) N(maxf0; t  2Dg)  f
= [(1  )3] N(maxf0; t  2Dg)  f
correct servers that were present at time maxf0; t  2Dg and are still active at time t+D.
This number is bounded below by
h
(1 )3
(1+)2
i
 jPresenttpj f since, by Lemma 49, N(maxf0; t 
2Dg)  jPresenttpj=(1 + )2. By Theorem 47, all of these servers are joined by time t.
Theorem 52. Every read or write operation invoked by a client that remains active com-
pletes.
Proof. Each operation consists of a read phase and a write phase. We show that each phase
terminates within 2D time, provided the client remains active (does not crash or leave).
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Consider a phase of an operation by client p that starts at time t. Every correct server
that joins by time t and is still active at time t + D receives p’s query or update message
and replies with a reply message or an ack message by time t+D. By Lemma 51, there are
at least
h
(1 )3
(1+)2
i
 jPresenttpj   f such servers.
From Constraint (3.18), Lemma 49 and Observation 48,

(1  )3
(1 + )2

 jPresenttpj   f    jPresenttpj    jMemberstpj = rw_boundtp:
Thus, by time t + 2D, p receives suﬃciently many replies or ack messages to complete the
phase.
3.2.5.3 Proof of Atomicity of BCCReg
Now we prove atomicity of the BCCReg algorithm. Let T be the set of read operations
that complete and write operations that execute line 74 of Algorithm 9. For any node p,
let tstp = (numtp; w_idtp) denote the timestamp of the latest value known to node p that
is recorded in its Known_Writes[p]p variable. Note that new timestamps are created by
write operations (on lines 70-71 of Algorithm 9) and are sent via enter-echo, update, and
update-echo messages. Initially, ts0p = (0;?) for all nodes p.
For any operation o in T by client p, the timestamp of its read phase, tsrp(o), is tstp, where
t is the end of its read phase (i.e., when the condition on line 64 of Algorithm 9 evaluates to
true). The timestamp of its write phase, tswp(o), is tstp, where t is the beginning of its write
phase (i.e., when it s-bcasts on line 74 of Algorithm 9). The timestamp of a read operation
in T is the timestamp of its read phase. The timestamp of a write operation in T is the
timestamp of its write phase.
Note that w_id is equal to p and num is set to one greater than the largest sequence
number occurring in at least f + 1 replies observed during an operation’s read phase. This
implies the next observation:
Observation 53. Each write operation in T has a unique timestamp.
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The next observation follows by a simple induction, since every timestamp other than
(0;?) comes from Lines 70-71 of Algorithm 9.
Observation 54. Consider any read op1 in T . If the timestamp of a read op1 is (0;?),
then op1 returns ?. Otherwise, there is a write op2 in T such that ts(op1) = ts(op2) and the
value returned by op1 equals the value written by op2.
If a read operation op1 returns the value written by a write operation op2, then we say
that op1 reads from op2.
Lemmas 55–35 show that write phase information propagates properly through the sys-
tem. They are analogous to Observation 43 and Lemmas 44–46, regarding the propagation
of information about server Enter, Joined, and Leave events.
Lemma 55. If o is an operation in T whose write phase w starts at tw, correct server p is
active at time t  tw +D, and tep  tw, then tstp  tswp(o).
Proof. Since server p is active throughout [tw; tw+D], it directly receives the update message
s-bcast by w at time tw. Hence, from lines 38–40 of Algorithm 8, tstp  tswp(o).
Lemma 56. Suppose a correct server p 62 S0 receives (f+1) enter-echo messages from correct
servers by time t00. Let the f +1st enter-echo message from a correct server be received from
q that sends it at time t0 in reply to an enter message from p. If o is an operation whose
write phase w starts at tw, p is active at time t  maxft00; tw + 2Dg, and the f + 1 correct
servers that send enter-echo messages are active throughout [tw; tw +D], then tstp  tswp(o).
Proof. By Lemma 41, there are at least f+1 correct joined servers that are active throughout
[tw; tw +D]. Since q is active throughout [tw; tw +D], it receives the update message from w
at some time t^ 2 [tw; tw +D], so tst^q  tswp(o). At time t00  t, p receives the enter-echo sent
by q at time t0. By the above argument, all f earlier enter-echo messages have timestamp
 tswp(o). So, the value of the timestamp in valid_valp and in Known_Writes[p]p is set to
 tswp(o). So tstp  tst00p  tst0q . If t0  t^, then tst0q  tst^q, so tstp  tswp(o). If t^ > t0, then q
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sends an update-echo at time t^  tw + D, and p receives it by time t^ + D  tw + 2D  t.
The same argument works for the other f correct, active servers in the system. Thus the
timestamp of the variable valid_valp and Known_Writes[p]p is either the timestamp of w
or of a later write. Thus, tstp  tst^q  tswp(o).
Lemma 57. If o is an operation in T whose write phase w starts at tw and correct server p
is active at time t  maxftep + 2D; tw +Dg, then tstp  tswp(o).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which correct servers enter the system.
Suppose the claim holds for all correct servers that enter before p. If tep  tw, which is the
case for all p 2 S0, then the claim follows from Lemma 55.
If tw < tep, then by Lemma 41, there are at least f+1 correct joined servers that are active
throughout [maxf0; tep   2Dg; tep + D]. These servers receive an enter message from p and
send an enter-echo message containing tst0q back to p. Let q be the server whose enter-echo
is the (f + 1)th enter-echo from a correct joined server to reach p. Let server q receive the
enter message from p at some time t0 2 [tep; tep + D]. The enter-echo message sent by q is
received by p at some time t00  t0 + D  tep + 2D  t. So, the value of the timestamp in
valid_valp and in turn Known_Writes[p]p for p is set to tstp  tst00p  tst0q
The first case is when tw  maxf0; tep   2Dg. Since tw + D < tep + D, it follows that
the f +1 correct joined servers including q are active throughout [tw; tw +D]. Furthermore,
t  tep + 2D  maxft00; tw + 2Dg. Hence, Lemma 56 implies that tstp  tswp(o).
The second case is when tw < maxf0; tep 2Dg. Since tw  0, it follows that tep 2D > 0,
teq  maxf0; tep  2Dg = tep  2D, and tw < tep  2D  t0  2D, so t0  maxfteq +2D; tw +Dg.
Note that q is active at time t0 and q enters before p, so, by the induction hypothesis,
tst
0
q  tswp(o). The above argument is true for all the other f correct joined servers that p
hears from. Hence, tstp  tswp(o).
Lemma 58. If o is an operation in T whose write phase starts at tw, correct server p 62 S0
joins at time tjp, and p is active at time t  maxftjp; tw + 2Dg, then tstp  tswp(o).
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Proof. The proof is adapted from Lemma 35 to tolerate f Byzantine servers .
Lemma 59 is the key lemma for proving atomicity of BCCReg. It shows that for two
non-overlapping operations in T , the timestamp of the read phase of the latter operation is
at least as big as the timestamp of the write phase of the former. Theorem 60 uses Lemma 59
to show that the timestamps of two non-overlapping operations respect real time ordering
and completes the proof of atomicity.
Lemma 59. For any two operations op1 and op2 in T , if op1 finishes before op2 starts, then
tswp(op1)  tsrp(op2).
Proof. Let p1 be the client that invokes op1, let w denote the write phase of op1, let tw be the
start time of w, and let w = tswp(op1) = tstwp1 . Similarly, let p2 be the client that invokes op2,
let r denote the read phase of op2, let tr be the start time of r, and let r = tsrp(op2) = tstrp2 .
Let Qw be the set of servers that p1 hears from during w (i.e., that sent messages causing
p1 to increment rw_counter on line 80 of Algorithm 9) and Qr be the set of servers that p2
hears from during r (i.e., that sent messages causing p2 to increment rw_counter on line 62
of Algorithm 9). Let Pw = jPresenttwp1 j and Mw = jMemberstwp1 j be the sizes of the Present
and Members sets belonging to p1 at time tw, and Pr = jPresenttrp2j and Mr = jMemberstrp2j
be the sizes of the Present and Members sets belonging to p2 at time tr.
Case I: tr > tw+2D. We start by showing that there exists f +1 correct servers in Qr such
that tjq  tr   2D.
Each server q 2 Qr receives and responds to r’s query, so q is joined by time tr +D. By
Theorem 47, the number of servers that can join during (tr 2D; tr+D] is at most the number
of servers that can enter in (maxf0; tr   4Dg; tr +D]. By Lemma 39, the number of servers
that can enter during (maxf0; tr 4Dg; tr+D] is at most ((1+)5 1) N(maxf0; tr 4Dg).
By Lemma 50, (1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  f Mr.
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From the code and Constraint (3.19), it follows that
jQrj  Mr >

(1 + )5   1 + 2f=NSmin
(1  )4   f=NSmin

Mr


(1 + )5   1 + 2f=NSmin
(1  )4   f=NSmin

 ((1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  f)
 [(1 + )5   1] N(maxf0; tr   4Dg) + 2f
which is 2f + 1 more than the maximum number of servers that can enter in (maxf0; tr  
4Dg; tr +D). At most f of these can be Byzantine. Thus, at least f + 1 correct servers in
Qr join by time tr   2D.
Suppose correct server q 2 Qr receives r’s query message at time t0  tr  tw + 2D. If
q 2 S0, then tjq = 0  tw, so, by Lemma 55, tst0q  tswp(op1) = w. Otherwise, q 62 S0, so
0 < tjq  tr 2D < t0. Since tw+2D < tr  t0, Lemma 35 implies that tst0q  tswp(op1) = w.
In either case, q responds to r’s query message with a timestamp at least as large as w and,
hence, r  w.
Case II: tr  tw+2D. Let J = fp j tjp < tr and p is an active server at time trg[fp j tr  tjp 
tr+Dg, which contains the set of all servers that reply to r’s query. By Theorem 47, all correct
servers that are present at time tr   2D join by time tr if they remain active. Therefore all
servers in J are either active at timemaxf0; tr 2Dg or enter during (maxf0; tr 2Dg; tr+D].
By Lemma 39, jJ j  (1 + )3N(maxf0; tr   2Dg).
Let K be the set of all servers that are present at time maxf0; tr  2Dg and do not leave
during (maxf0; tr   2Dg; tr + D]. Note that K contains all the servers in Qw that do not
leave during [tw; tr +D]  [maxf0; tr   2Dg; tr +D]. By Lemma 40 and Constraint (3.14),
at most (1  (1  )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg) servers leave during [maxf0; tr   2Dg; tr +D].
From the code, jQrj  Mr and, by Lemma 50, Mr  (1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  f .
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So,
jQrj  

(1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  f

:
Similarly, jQwj  Mw   [(1  )4N(maxf0; tw   4Dg)  f ]. Therefore, the size of K is
at least
jKj  jQwj   (1  (1  )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)  f
  (1  )4N(maxf0; tw   4Dg)  f  (1  (1  )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)  f:
Since tr   tw  2D, it follows that maxf0; tr   4Dg   maxf0; tw   4Dg  2D. By
Lemma 39, N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  (1 + )2  N(maxf0; tw   4Dg). Thus we can replace
N(maxf0; tw   4Dg) in the above expression with (1 + ) 2  N(maxf0; tr   4Dg) and get
the following expression for jQrj+ jKj:
jQrj+ jKj [(1  )4N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  f ]
+ [(1  )4(1 + ) 2N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  f ]
  (1  (1  )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)  f
= [(1  )4(1 + ) 2(2 + 2 + 2)N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  2f ]
  (1  (1  )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)  f:
By Lemma 39, N(maxf0; tr   4Dg)  (1  ) 2N(maxf0; tr   2Dg): Thus,
jQrj+ jKj  [(1  )2(1 + ) 2(2 + 2 + 2)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)  2f ]
  (1  (1  )3)N(maxf0; tr   2Dg)  f
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By Constraint (3.20),
 >
(1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1 + (1 + 3f)=NSmin
[(2 + 2 + 2)(1  )2(1 + ) 2]  2f=NSmin :
Let Ntr2D = N(maxf0; tr   2Dg). So,
jQrj+ jKj 
0@

(1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1 + (1+3f)
NSmin

((2 + 2 + 2)(1  )2(1 + ) 2)  2f=NSmin
1A


(2 + 2 + 2)(1  )2(1 + ) 2   2f
Ntr2D

Ntr2D
  (1  (1  )3)]Ntr2D   f
Since, Ntr2D  NSmin, we get
jQrj+ jKj 
 
(1 + )3   (1  )3 + 1 + (1 + 3f)=NSmin

Ntr2D
  f   (1  (1  )3)]Ntr2D   f
 (1 + )3Ntr2D + 2f + 1  jJ j+ 2f + 1:
This implies that the intersection of K and Qr has at least 2f + 1 servers. For each servers
p in the intersection, tsp  w when p sends its reply to r. Since at most f servers can
be Byzantine, there are at least f + 1 correct servers that reply with tsp  w. Thus the
timestamp of valid_valp on Line number 103 is  w, thus, w  r.
Theorem 60. BCCReg ensures atomicity.
Proof. The proof is adapted from Theorem 37.
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4. CONCLUSION
4.1 Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation describes my research to provide fault-tolerant distributed services in
the network topology and middleware layers of a distributed system in message-passing
models.
In Section 2.1 we have implemented the eventually perfect failure detector (P ) in an
arbitrary partitionable network model composed of ADD channels which experience un-
bounded message loss and unbounded message delay for a majority of the messages. This
work is an important step towards understanding the minimal assumptions on network topol-
ogy, message sizes, reliability of channels and partial synchrony necessary to implement this
oracle. The algorithm is quite practical for sparsely connected graphs as the number of paths
between two nodes (and the message size) will be  n!. Even though the message size for
this algorithm is bounded, can we do better than our current results using smaller messages
or fewer messages? We think that these are important questions that need to be answered
in the future.
In Section 3.1 we have shown how to emulate an atomic read/write register in a crash-
prone system where nodes can enter and leave continually and there is no upper bound on
the system size. Our churn model places a limit on the number of nodes entering and leaving
during each time interval of length D as a fraction of the number of nodes in the system at
the beginning of the interval. This definition is easy to state and does not depend on the
way our algorithm works. Our failure model requires the number of crashed nodes to be at
most a fraction of the nodes in the system. Separating crashes, which are unannounced, from
leaves, which are announced, allows more flexibility. We also proved a lower bound showing
that the existence of churn makes it impossible to achieve the same level of failure-resiliency
as in the static case.
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There are a number of directions for future work. A natural question is whether the
small churn rate and failure fraction of our algorithm can be improved, perhaps with a
tighter analysis. Proving additional lower bounds or tradeoﬀs on these parameters is one
interesting avenue. However, it might be possible to completely avoid the bound  on the
churn rate. To prevent the number of nonfaulty nodes from becoming too small, a node
might need to obtain permission before leaving, similarly to what our algorithm does for
joining. This might enable an algorithm to ensure atomicity even when churn rate is high.
Or, perhaps some of the ideas in [69] can be adapted to obtain a modification of our algorithm
that ensures this.
Since the number of crashed nodes must never exceed a fixed fraction of the nodes present
in the system, the system can get into a situation in which no more nodes can crash or leave
unless more nodes enter. If crashed nodes could be detected in some way, then they could
be treated as nodes that have left, thus freeing up the ability for more nodes to crash or
leave. If some mechanism outside the system identifies crashed nodes and informs nodes in
the system, then leave messages can be sent on behalf of these crashed nodes, analogously
to [11] and [12]. It may even be possible to use ongoing, but bounded, churn to detect
crashed nodes, rather than relying on an out-of-system mechanism.
The communication complexity of our algorithm grows without bound. Our algorithm
sends increasingly large Changes sets. The amount of information communicated might be
reduced by sending only recent events, or by removing very old events. Furthermore, the
unbounded counters might be avoided with ideas from [70].
In Section 3.2 we provide an algorithm that emulates a Byzantine-tolerant atomic register
in a dynamic system that never stops changing and has no upper bound on the system size.
We also provide an impossibility proof that in our model, the maximum number of Byzantine
servers cannot be described as a fraction of the current system size.
There are several directions for future work. The values of , f and NSmin that satisfy
our algorithm are quite restrictive. It will be nice to see if such restrictions are necessary or
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if they can be improved either with a better algorithm or a tighter correctness analysis.
Currently our model tolerates the most severe end of the fault severity spectrum and
paper [17] considered the most benign end of the fault severity spectrum. The impossibility
result in Section 3.2.3 showing that we cannot have Byzantine servers as a fraction of the
system size is quite restrictive too. In future, we would like to investigate if the same
impossibility extends to less severe failures like omission failures and timing failures [71]. Our
work assumes that digital signatures are available for authenticated Byzantine fault tolerance.
A diﬀerent direction for future work is the implementation of these digital signatures in
dynamic systems and explore its relation to network security.
The current way of restricting churn relies on the unknown upper bound D on message
delay. Even though nodes have no way of measuring D and it was shown in [17] that
consensus is impossible to solve in this model, it may be a bit confusing and we would like
to explore an alternative way of bounding the churn that doesn’t rely on the existence of D.
An alternative is to define the churn rate with respect to messages in transit. For example,
at all times, the number of servers that can enter/leave the system when any message is in
transit at most  times the system size when the message was sent. It may be possible to
prove that the two models are indeed equivalent, or to show that the algorithms still work,
or can be modified to work, in the new model.
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